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Abstract
In this set of essays, I grapple with issues related to the core questions of urban economics. Why
are people so heavily clustered in urban areas? Why do some cities grow while others decline?
What explains where people live within urban areas? My first essay focuses on understanding
patterns of racial segregation within metro areas. One factor that has long been hypothesized
to contribute to this divide, but has proven difficult to test empirically, is that local zoning
regulations have an exclusionary impact on minority residents in some neighborhoods. I focus
on variation in block-level racial composition within narrow bands around zone borders within
jurisdictions. My results imply a large role for local zoning regulation, particularly the permitting
of dense multi-family structures, in explaining disparate racial location patterns. The second
essay returns to core issues of agglomeration and the role of cities. The fact that wages tend to
be higher in cities, and that this premium grows with density, has been seen as strong evidence
for urban agglomeration forces enhancing productivity. In modern data this density premium
seems only to exist in areas with above average levels of human capital. Agglomeration models
emphasizing learning and knowledge spillovers between workers in close proximity seem most
compatible with the data. Finally, I investigate the impact of local governance structure on urban
growth over the last 40 years. Some economists have touted the virtues of competition between
fragmented local governments in efficient provision of local public goods, while regionalists have
pointed to the need to coordinate planning and infrastructure across jurisdictions, and warned
of the impacts of fractionalization on segregation and sprawl. While cities with regionalized
governments have grown more rapidly, a small set of strong historical correlates with local
government density can account for this. Impacts on segregation are more robust.
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Introduction
Why do people live where they do? No question is more central to the field of urban economics,
and to my mind it remains one of the most compelling questions in all of economics. Finding an
answer first requires confronting the overwhelming clustering of people in urban areas. What
makes cities and suburbs so attractive to people and firms? Why has this attraction grown over
time?
Moving beyond the urban-rural divide, cities have their own unique characters. Why do some
cities grow while others decline? Are these paths determined by external economic forces, or do
local governments play a role in determining their fate?
Finally, what determines the internal structure of a city? Why do some cities sprawl while
others maintain more compact footprints? Why do we see high levels of segregation between
people of different races and classes?
In the three essays in this dissertation I grapple with issues related to each of these three
fundamental questions of urban economics. First, I explore the implications of land use restriction
on racial segregation within Massachusetts metro areas. More than fifty percent of the black
population in the Boston metro area would have to move in order for there to be an equal
distribution of blacks and non-blacks across the region. What explains this high level of segregation
within an urban area? One factor that has long been hypothesis to contribute to this divide, but
has proven difficult to test empirically, is that local zoning regulations in many neighborhoods
have an exclusionary impact for some minority residents. Using detailed spatial data available
for all municipalities in Massachusetts I am able to provide some of the best empirical evidence
to date on the impact of density zoning regulation on location choices by race. Capitalizing on
the geographic detail in the data, I focus on variation in block-level racial composition within
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narrow bands around zone borders within jurisdictions, mitigating omitted variable concerns
that arise in studies focusing on larger geographic units. My results imply a large role for local
zoning regulation, particularly the permitting of dense multi-family structures, in explaining
disparate racial location patterns.
The second essay backs away from the within region questions and examines the role that
human capital plays in explaining urban clustering. One compelling explanation for why humans
cluster in cities is because their proximity makes them more productive. The fact that wages
tend to be higher in cities, and that this premium grows with density, has often been taken
as strong evidence for urban agglomeration forces being important in explaining per worker
productivity. As Edward L. Glaeser and I point out in this essay, in modern data this density
premium seems only to exist in urban areas that also have relatively high levels of human
capital. What can explain this complementarity between cities and skills? We argue that learning
models emphasizing knowledge spillovers between workers who live in closer proximity seem most
compatible with the data.
Finally, I investigate the role of the structure of local governance in explaining why some cities
have grown faster than others over the last 40 years. Many economists, starting with Tiebout,
have touted the virtues of competition between jurisdictions in fragmented metropolitan areas in
promoting efficient provision of local public goods. Regionalists have pushed back against this,
pointing to the need to coordinate land use planning and investments in infrastructure across
jurisdictions, and warning of the impacts of fractionalization on segregation and sprawl. Due to
the remarkable permanence of municipal and town governments over the past half century, these
hypotheses can be tested by looking at urban performance across US metro areas over the last
40 years where levels of government fractionalization differ substantially. Though disentangling
impacts proves difficult, it appears that arguments for regionalism based on the strong performance
of regionally governed areas over this period are weakened substantially by controlling for a small
set of variables with strong historical correlations with local government density. Comparing the
internal structure of cities with different types of governance, I find that impacts on sprawl are
similarly difficult to detect, while positive correlations between fractionalization and growth in
racial segregation and the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree seem more robust to
2
the inclusion of controls.
I hope that these three papers will contribute to our understanding of the role that zoning,
human capital and local governance play in determining where people and economic activity
locate in space.
3
Chapter 1
The Impact of Land Use Regulation
on Segregation: Evidence from
Massachusetts Zoning Borders
1.1 Introduction
Since the advent of mass suburbanization in the middle of the 20th century, the racial geography
of most American metropolitan areas has followed a familiar pattern. Black and Hispanic
households reside in neighborhoods proximate to the dense urban core, with the population of
each subsequent ring of suburbs becoming whiter and more sparsely populated. Even as racial
segregation may have peaked (Glaeser and Vigdor, 2012) and minority suburbanization has
drawn increased attention (Weise, 2004), the relationship between the black population and
residential density remains striking, particularly in Northern and Midwestern cities.
Density is not merely the outcome of a decentralized housing market. Local zoning regulations
have played a key role in keeping lot sizes large and multi-family housing rare in many jurisdictions.
As the prevalence of restrictive zoning regulations increased in the 1960s and 1970s, the question
arose among economists and other urban scholars whether such laws were causing increased
racial segregation. While the letter of the law was exclusionary only towards certain classes
of residential land use, many hypothesized that the true impact extended towards exclusion of
4
classes and races of people. In some cases historians have documented that such outcomes were
in fact the intent of the laws, pointing towards jurisdictions enacting such regulation in the wake
of Supreme Court cases striking down communities’ abilities to enforce racial segregation through
public regulation in 1917 or private restrictive covenants in 1948 (Danielson, 1976).
Regardless of the intent of such laws, the causal impact of zoning regulation on residential
segregation remains an open empirical question. Though the strong correlation between density
and minority concentration is readily apparent in population data, the relative scarcity of
comprehensive zoning datasets has made gaining traction on the question difficult. The types
of statutes used to restrict building differ considerably across jurisdictions, leaving researchers
with a maze of lot size restrictions, frontage and setback regulations, floor to area ratios, and
specific use prohibitions coupled with procedures for negotiating allowances through layers of local
bureaucracy. Fortunately, in recent years researchers and government agencies have compiled
comprehensive and navigable land use restriction datasets that make progress on this question
achievable.
Taking advantage of particularly detailed spatial data made available to the public by the
Massachusetts Office of Geographic Information (MassGIS) I am able here to assess the impact
of zoning restrictions on minority population shares at the block level within jurisdictions in
the major metropolitan areas of Massachusetts. The geographic detail of the data allows me to
conduct an analysis of the impact of zoning regulation on minority population shares on either
side of borders where land use regulation changes.
My focus on the impact of narrow spatial variation in land use restriction allows me to
circumvent many of the omitted variable concerns that arise at higher levels of geographic
aggregation. While zoning regulation may be one of the driving forces of racial segregation,
there are many other factors that drive minorities and whites to live in different communities.
Racial residential location could be influenced by historical settlement patterns that developed
in the aftermath of the great black migration of the early 20th century and subsequent white
suburbanization, by access to public transportation, differing willingness and ability to pay for
local amenities and public goods, housing discrimination or decentralized racism. To the extent
these factors differ between places with high and low levels of land use regulation, estimates of
5
the impact of such laws may be confounded.
By zeroing in on differences in racial population shares along narrow bands on either side
of within jurisdiction zoning borders I am able to minimize the impact of these other city and
neighborhood factors that should vary more continuously across the boundary. Though some
caution is warranted in taking these boundaries as exogenous to racial population shares, I argue
that such concerns are lessened given the consistency of these laws over long time periods, and
my ability to restrict the dataset to boundaries not coincident with other natural and manmade
features.
Using this border design I find robust evidence that land use regulation does negatively impact
minority population shares on more restrictively zoned blocks in the 2010 Census. Increasing the
allowable density by five dwelling units per acre, roughly the standard deviation in Massachusetts
metropolitan areas, increases the block’s black share by 1.9 percentage points and the Hispanic
share by 2.5 percentage points, over a quarter of the mean level of each group. The impact of by
right allowance of multi-family housing is particularly strong for both groups, and this is as true
in the suburbs as the urban core. Permitting multi-family housing leads to a 3.36 percentage
point higher black share and a 5.77 percentage point increase in the Hispanic share.
The impact, particularly for Hispanics, has grown stronger over the last 20 years and land use
regulation is strongly predictive of growth in block-level minority shares between 1990 and 2010.
I conclude by extrapolating these findings to the metro area level, finding that equalizing zoning
across the Boston Metro Area could more than halve the gap between heavily zoned Boston
and lightly zoned Houston on a common segregation measure. These results strongly confirm
the hypothesis that zoning negatively impacts racial integration, while suggesting caution in
interpreting the even larger impacts found in cross-MSA studies.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2 I discuss two previous empirical contributions
to this literature. Section 1.3 discusses the MassGIS and Census data used here. In Section 1.4 I
provide a simple model to motivate the empirical work and suggest mechanisms by which land
use regulation might affect segregation. Section 1.5 presents the main results, Section 1.6 offers
discussion and Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 Existing Evidence on the Impact of Land Use Restrictions
on Segregation
The hypothesis that restrictive zoning may lead to decreased minority residence in more prohibitive
areas and greater overall segregation has long been present in the economics literature (e.g.
Downs (1973); Fischel (1985)). Rigorous empirical examination of the hypothesis has only been
undertaken more recently. Pendall (2000) compiled a dataset with the intent of examining
this question, gathering survey responses from planning directors in 1168 jurisdictions across
the 25 largest US metropolitan areas. He estimates that jurisdictions allowing only what he
defined as low-density housing (no more than 8 units per acre) had less than half the black
populations of those without such controls and only 60 percent as large a Hispanic populations in
1980. Furthermore, the growth in minority populations was lower for jurisdictions allowing only
low-density housing, with the black and Hispanic populations growing 0.8 and 0.5 percentage
points more slowly, respectively.
Building on an updated version of Pendall’s data (Pendall et al., 2006) as well as incorporating
data from the Wharton Land Use Regulation Index (Gyourko et al., 2008), Rothwell and Massey
(2009) study the impact of zoning restrictions on metro area level segregation across the largest
49 US metro areas. To quantify segregation they use dissimilarity index, a metric defined over
two racial groups that measures the percentage of one group that would need to move to ensure
a uniform share of that group across the area. They find that increasing the maximum allowable
density by one standard deviation decreases the dissimilarity index of a metro area by between
four and seven percentage points in the 1990 and 2000 cross-sections, depending on the OLS
specification. Their point estimate implies that moving from one end of the distribution to the
other would lower the dissimilarity index by 25 percentage points. Instrumental variables show
a slightly larger effect, with a point estimate of 8 percentage points for a standard deviation
change. They also show that a standard deviation higher level of maximum density is associated
with an 8 percentage point higher (less negative) change in the dissimilarity index between 1980
and 2000 with most of the effect concentrated in the earlier part of the period, and this is fairly
similar between the OLS and the IV regressions.
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These findings lend credence to the hypothesis that restrictive zoning might have quite large
effects on racial segregation, but some caution is warranted. While both sets of authors are well
aware that other differences may exist between places with strict and lax zoning regimes, their
data allow limited investigation of potential omitted variables bias. In the case of Rothwell and
Massey, one might worry that the instrument of year of statehood, which is nearly collinear with
region effects, might be acting on segregation through any number of mechanisms beyond density
zoning. The regional patterns in the dissimilarity index are striking - for instance, the top 9 most
segregated metro areas in the 2010 Census are all in the “rust belt” region of the upper Midwest
(Glaeser and Vigdor, 2012), suggesting a role for other channels such as disparate impacts of the
Great Migration of blacks from the South in the early 20th century (see, for instance, Boustan
(2010)). While Rothwell and Massey argue that the density result holds within regions when
they run the regressions separately, isolating the effect of zoning across metro areas remains
challenging.
1.3 The MassGIS Zoning Data
The data for this project come from the State of Massachusetts’s Office of Geographic Information
(MassGIS). The spatial data available from MassGIS span a broad set of topics including economic
and housing development, transportation, natural features, local governmental boundaries and
the environment. This study focuses primarily on the zoning data, which was compiled by
MassGIS from maps sent in by each town’s government or planning agency around the year 2000 .
The data include polygons with the precise boundaries of each zone as well as the written bylaws
corresponding to that zone and a series of coded variables derived from these bylaws. As town
zoning bylaws can differ substantially in intent and wording between jurisdictions, compiling
uniform spatial data with this level of detail and geographic scope is quite rare - in fact I know
of no other state that makes such data available. The data is described extensively and explored
by Wheaton and Evenson (2003) and has been used by Zabel and Dalton (2011) to examine the
effect of zoning on housing prices.
The main variables used in this study are derived from the “primary use” variable, which
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classifies zones to one of 21 categories including 9 residential categories, 5 commercial categories,
2 industrial categories, 2 institutional categories, a mixed use category, an unzoned category and
a category for land preserved for conservation or recreation. Within residential, the primary
focus here, three multi-family housing categories separate land zoned for multi-family structures
with densities of 3 to 8 dwelling units, 9 to 20 units and greater than 20 units per acre. The
remaining six categories break down single family or duplex housing by minimum lot size, varying
from a low category of 5,000 to 15,000 square feet (3 to 8 units per acre) to the largest category
of 80,000 square feet and above (at least 2 acres per lot) as well as a category for mixed low
density agricultural and residential. Importantly, residential areas are coded by their densest
possible use by right, that is, the densest structures that can be built without special permitting.
In practice some local zoning boards are more lenient than others in granting allowances, but
this coding allows an exploration of the effect of zoning laws as written, rather than as they have
being interpreted over time, a variable more likely to be exogenous to current local conditions.
The main dependent variables come from race data at the block level taken from 2010
US Census 100 percent sample (Summary File 1) geocoded using the Census Tiger shapefiles.
Census blocks are the smallest unit of geography available to the public and data are available
at this level for only a small set of variables: populations by age, sex, race, Hispanic origin,
household type and whether the housing unit is owned or rented. Blocks are delineated by roads
or geographic features, and vary in size depending on population density. Urban blocks tend to
encompass literal blocks, surrounded on all four sides by adjacent roads, whereas rural blocks can
be substantially larger. Not all blocks are populated - some, for instance, are entirely covered
by water. These unpopulated blocks are dropped from the analysis. Of those with non-zero
populations, the blocks in Massachusetts metropolitan areas used here range from 1 to 4025
people with a median of 44 people and correspond to land areas between 0.02 and 5157 acres,
with a median of 5.62 acres.
I overlay the blocks onto the zone data and classify each block by primary use if at least 90
percent of the block shares the same designated land use. I have probed the robustness of cutoffs
from 75 percent up to 99 percent and the results are broadly similar. The threshold presents a
tradeoff - a lower threshold introduces measurement error biasing the results downwards, but a
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higher threshold lowers sample size, reducing power. The 90 percent threshold tends to yield
similar point estimates to higher values without compromising power, whereas lower thresholds
show more severe attenuation. With the 90 percent threshold about 23 percent of blocks cannot
be categorized as having a single use, with 70 percent falling into one of the nine residential
categories and the remaining seven percent having either commercial, industrial, institutional or
conservation uses.
The first column of Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for populated blocks in Massachusetts
metropolitan areas. The majority (63.13 percent) of the blocks are in the Boston metro area,
but blocks from Worcester, Springfield and the Massachusetts portion of the Providence metro
area are also included. The population is 6.96 percent percent black, 10.08 percent Hispanic,
and 75.05 percent non-Hispanic white.1 The three races have strikingly different rates of renting
versus owning, with blacks (66.53 percent) and Hispanics (75.44 percent) renting at over twice
the rate of whites (31.67 percent).
In terms of land use, 6.52 percent of blocks are zoned for multi-family residential use with
most of that being denser than 8 units per acre. The 63.25 percent of land zoned for single family
use is spilt roughly evenly between what I define as low (lot sizes over an acre), medium, and
high (less than 3/8 of an acre lot sizes) density uses. I construct a linear measure of zoning by
taking the 9 categorical measures of residential zoning and assigning each the average dwelling
units per acre observed in the data for that category. This measure varies from 0.5 to 22 units
per acre with a mean of 4.21 and a median of 4.73.
To ensure comparability between blocks in my sample, I employ several selection criteria.
Starting with 82,071 blocks, I drop those with non-residential or split land use (23,079 blocks),
with anyone housed in group quarters (2,724 blocks), with any public housing (687 blocks), with
land areas greater than 160 acres, equivalent to a square quarter mile (3,074 blocks) and where
more than ten percent of the land area is covered by water (146 blocks). It is from this remaining
set of 52,359 blocks that I draw the border samples.
1Black here is defined as black alone, not in combination with other races, and includes Black Hispanics. This
is the subgroup for which the most data is available on Census Summary File 1.
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To construct my border samples I classify a block as falling on a zoning border if it intersects
a 50 meter band drawn around a boundary where the type of permitted residential land use
changes. I use only borders within towns, and omit those that fall along highways, streams or
railroad tracks, as such barriers may serve as natural neighborhood dividing lines, and I want to
ensure that blocks on both sides of the border have similar neighborhood characteristics (see, for
instance, Ananat (2011) for an exploration of the role of historical railroad lines in demarcating
racial neighborhood boundaries.)
As an example, Figure 1 shows zoning regulation for Cambridge, Massachusetts and blocks
identified as being on zoning borders. Like most inner suburban areas, Cambridge residential
land use is split between multi-family housing and high density single-family housing. From the
map we can see that the south and east of the city are largely zoned for multi-family housing and
commercial while the north and west have mostly single-family zoning. Given that differences may
exist between the two regions of the city, such as historic settlement patterns, access to popular
commercial areas, parks and universities, and proximity to heavier industry, we would not expect
differences in composition between the two to be driven entirely by land use regulation. However,
focusing on the outlined blocks, it is more plausible that the differences in block composition one
sees when crossing one of the dark black borders is a result of the differential land use on either
side.2
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the black population in Cambridge, and similarities
between the two figures do suggest that the black population is more heavily concentrated in
areas with multi-family zoning. However, focusing on variation across borders where neighborhood
characteristics are held constant, patterns are harder to discern from cursory inspection.
Returning to Table 1.1, three main border samples are used in the analysis. Column 2 shows
descriptive statistics for blocks that lie on any zoning border where residential land use changes.
These blocks are broadly similar to the full set of metro Massachusetts blocks, though somewhat
more black (10.05 percent), more concentrated in the Boston metro area and more likely to be
zoned for multi-family housing.
2Not all blocks surrounding borders are outlined due to those blocks failing one of the sample selection criteria.
Generally these blocks either have zero population, a positive group quarters population, or are split between two
land use categories.
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The third and fourth columns look at two important subsets of the border sample. Column 3
shows blocks on either side of boundaries where land use changes between single-family residential
and multi-family residential. These blocks have considerably larger minority populations, both for
blacks (15.37 percent) and Hispanics (13.56 percent). They are also more densely populated, have
more rental units per acre, are smaller in land area, closer to major city centers and particularly
concentrated in Boston’s urban core, defined here as Boston and the 9 suburban communities
that lie within 5 miles of the city center.3 The fourth column gives statistics for the sample
comprised of blocks that lie on borders between single-family residential zones with different
minimum lot sizes. These blocks have very small minority populations (1.93 percent black and
3.24 percent Hispanic), lower population densities, few rental units, and are more likely to be
located along the Route 128 corridor in suburban Boston than in the urban core.
Along with the 2010 Census data, I also use past census block data to examine changes in
racial composition over time. Because the spatial scope of census blocks is not consistent across
decades, I geographically match blocks using the Census’s Tiger Shapefiles. The need for this
match limits the analysis to the time period of 1990 to 2010 as spatial data at the block level is
not available before 1990. I keep blocks where I can find a set of 1990 blocks that are completely
contained within a 2010 block and comprise more than 75 percent percent of the land area of
that block, or meet the same criteria fitting 2010 blocks into 1990 blocks. This yields a match
rate of about 60 percent for populated blocks.
Finally, I make use of individual tax parcel data from MassGIS to investigate the types of
structures present on each block. As with the land use regulations, these data were compiled by
MassGIS through submissions from local officials. I use data for the entire Boston metro area
with the notable exception of Boston itself, where data is not available.
1.4 A Model of Housing Choice and Density Zoning
Consider the housing market in the Boston metro area (or analogously, the Springfield or
Worcester metro areas.) I assume that the market is in static spatial equilibrium such that at
3See the Appendix for the set of towns located in each sub-region of Greater Boston.
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price vector P* everybody is living in their preferred home; that is, they are maximizing their
indirect utility function:
(1.1)Vi(Hj) = f
(
P ∗j (Xj , Zn) , Xj , Zn
)
where Xj is a vector of attributes of the property such as structure type, housing tenure, lot
size, interior amenities and distance to business districts, and Zn is a vector of neighborhood
characteristics such as local amenities and public goods, neighbors and the neighborhood’s built
environment. Though the functional form of this relationship will not be crucial for the estimation
in this paper, to fix ideas I will assume this takes the linear form:
(1.2)Vi(Hj) = −αiP ∗j (Xj , Zn) +Xjβi + Znωi + ij
where the coefficients are allowed to differ across individuals. If housing within a block
is relatively comparable, we could think of the j subscripts as referencing blocks rather than
housing units, and think of this as a function describing people’s preferences over consuming a
unit of housing on a given block in the Boston area. The land use density restrictions that are of
interest here are unlikely to enter the utility function directly. Rather, they affect individual
well-being through their equilibrium impacts on the other variables in the utility function. This
can be seen in the equation by introducing a small perturbation in density zoning:
(1.3)
Vi(Hj) = −αi
(
P˜ ∗j +
(
∂Pj
∂Dj
+
∂Pj
∂Xj
∂Xj
∂Dj
+
∂Pj
∂Zj
∂Zj
∂Dj
)
dDj
)
+
(
X˜j +
∂Xj
∂Dj
dDj
)
′βi +
(
Z˜n +
∂Zn
∂Dj
dDj
)
′ωi + ij
Rearranging and assuming that the derivatives take a linear form over the relevant range of
zoning regulations yields
(1.4)
Vi(Hj) = (−αiδpd + δxd (βi − αiδpx))Dj
+ δzd (ωi − αiδpz)Dj − αiP˜ ∗j + X˜jβi + Z˜nωi + ij
One could in principal use a structural approach to modeling these preference parameters by
race based on observed racial location patterns (see Bajari and Kahn (2005) for a strategy in this
spirit in the context of racial residential preferences) but this would require data from multiple
markets with zoning data, or individual level housing data that allowed geographic identification
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at the zone level. Instead, following Black (1999), I pursue a reduced form strategy taking
advantage of the sharp spatial discontinuities created by within-town zoning borders. Underlying
this strategy is the assumption that density zoning regulation is the only thing changing at the
border. The neighborhood characteristics, as well as the residual attributes and price of the
housing stock should remain fixed. Under this assumption, the indirect utility function simplifies
to:
(1.5)Vi(Hj) = (−αiδpd + δxd (βi − αiδpx))Dj + θb + ij
where θb is a fixed border effect that absorbs all terms constant at the neighborhood level.
Estimating this directly would require assumptions on the error terms that would allow me to
convert this into an equation about the observed data, which are racial shares at the block level.
Since I’m less interested in the specific preference parameters than I am in the aggregate impact
of density zoning, I estimate the simple linear specification:
(1.6)Srj = γDj + θb + µj
where Srj is the share of block j that is of race r, γ will be some function of the differences
by race in the distributions of the preference parameters αi and βi and the zoning impacts on
price and housing attributes δpd, δxd, and δpx, θb represents a zone border fixed effect and µj
is a mean zero error term that I will allow to be correlated within town but is assumed to be
independent across towns.
Although the preference parameters within the γ function cannot be separately identified
with this strategy, their presence in the indirect utility function provides a nice summation
of the potential mechanisms through which zoning regulation might lead to changes in racial
composition. Looking at equation 1.5, the first term, −αiδpd is the direct impact of zoning on
price holding other housing and neighborhood characteristics fixed multiplied by a measure of
individual price sensitivity that could differ on average across races. In theory this direct impact
should be small if units are highly substitutable across blocks, though estimates of the direct
price impact of zoning vary in the literature ((Glaeser and Ward, 2009; Zabel and Dalton, 2011)).
The second term, δxd(βi − αiδpx) shows the two channels through which changes in the
housing stock that result from zoning regulations affect racial shares. Races might have different
preferences βi, on average, for attributes of housing such as structure type, tenure or lot size.
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Alternatively, it might be that the types of housing built on the strictly zoned blocks differ in
price from those on the surrounding more less strictly zoned blocks, and that races might be
differentially sensitive to that change. Given the differences in average income and wealth across
racial groups, it seems quite plausible that this price channel might play a significant role. A
common argument for why density zoning is exclusionary is that it prices out poorer people who
would like to live on the block but desire a quantity of land below the minimum threshold.
A third term, δzd(ω − αiδpz) appeared in equation 1.4, but is absorbed by the border effect
in the regression specification. This term represents the impact of zoning induced changes in
equilibrium neighborhood characteristics on the racial composition of the neighborhood, first
through differing preferences between races for neighborhood characteristics, and second through
a price channel if zoning induces neighborhood level changes that alter the price of housing in
the neighborhood. Crucially here, any neighborhood changes induced by zoning on one block
are assumed to be felt on neighboring blocks regardless of on which side of the zoning border
they fall. Therefore, the border design will not identify this mechanism as part of the effect of
density zoning regulation. A much studied dimension on which blacks and whites might differ is
preferences for the racial makeup of the neighborhood itself. The failure of the border design to
detect this effect is one of the main weaknesses of applying the approach in this context, and
suggests that the estimates here might be biased downwards compared to the true long run
impact of zoning regulation. I will return to a discussion of this issue in the section 1.6.
1.5 The Impact of Density Zoning on Racial Location Patterns
Table 1.2 shows the results of regressions of the black share of the block population on permitted
density, as measure by dwelling units per acre. Column 1 provides the estimate of equation 1.6
above, a linear regression of the share of the population that is black on dwelling units per acre
with border fixed effects included in the regression, run on the sample of blocks that fall on a
zoning border. Standard errors are clustered at the town level, as they are in all subsequent
regressions unless noted.
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The coefficient, significant at the 1 percent level, indicates that an extra unit of density,
measured in units permitted per acre, increases the black share on the block by 0.38 percentage
points, where the baseline average black share is 7 percent in the overall population and 10
percent in the border sample. This suggests quite large effects of shifts in zoning of plausible
magnitudes. For instance, lowering lot sizes from half acre lots to 8000-square foot lots (similar
to the average in the densest single family zoning category) would increase the black share by
1.14 percentage points. Permitting of high-density multi-family housing, with densities of over 20
units per acre, would be expected to have extremely large impacts.
In column two I add controls for distance in miles to the metro area’s main city center
(Boston, Worcester or Springfield) and whether any body of water is present on the block. Both
are strong negative predictors of black population in the full sample, but the impact of density
zoning on the black population is unaffected by their inclusion in the border regression. Neither
show up as significant predictors of the black share, suggesting that the sample is reasonably
well-balanced on these dimensions.
My theory gives me little guidance as to the shape of the relationship between race and
zoning, so I next fit a logarithmic model to the data. Unfortunately the black population at the
block level is frequently zero, so I divide this into two regressions - one to predict the zeros and
the other a regression in logs on the non-zero data. Column 3 reports the marginal effects from a
probit model of the impact of density zoning on the having no black population. Not surprisingly,
more densely zoned places are less likely to have zero black population than less densely zoned
blocks across the border from them, though the coefficient of 2.35 percentage points is small
when compared to the fact that over 60 percent of blocks in the sample have no black population.
Given this prevalence of zeros, the number of observations in column 4 shrinks considerably.
The coefficient I get from regressing the log of the black share on the log of the density measure
implies that doubling zoned density increases the black population by 17.46 percent on blocks
with positive black populations. This may be a better fit for the data than the linear measure,
though interpretation is complicated by the large number of dropped blocks. Zeroing in on the
impact at certain points in the distribution is likely to be more illuminating, as I will explore in
the next table.
19
Before turning to that, in columns 5 and 6, I illustrate the impact of the use of the border
design by running ordinary least squares in the full sample of Massachusetts metro areas with
and without town fixed effects to benchmark the results. The coefficient in standard OLS is
over twice the size of the border estimate from column 1, emphasizing that these blocks differ in
more than just how they are zoned. Not surprisingly, much of the variation in the share black
of the block population can be explained by the tendency of blacks to live disproportionately
in jurisdictions clustered in highly urbanized areas with lax density restrictions, as we see by
moving to the town fixed effect regression.
However, it is surprising that the town fixed effects estimator shrinks the effect to half the
size of the border fixed effects estimator and that this effect is insignificant at conventional levels.
This is driven largely by the city of Boston, where the black population is highly concentrated
in the south and west of the city which are zoned mostly for low density multi-family and high
density single-family housing, whereas the whiter areas closer to the city center are zoned for
denser multi-unit high rises. After dropping Boston in column 7 the town fixed effects estimate
looks similar to the one from the border design.
Taking Boston on its own in columns 8 and 9, using Huber-White robust standard errors
and running OLS in the full sample shows a strong and significant negative coefficient, but the
border regressions shows a small and insignificant positive effect. This illustrates the need to
focus on narrow variation within neighborhoods rather than within town variation that may
be confounded by omitted neighborhood level variables. The confidence interval for the border
regression in Boston alone is certainly too large to rule out that the effect may be equal to
that of the full sample, though the smaller effect would be consistent with the hypothesis that
upzoning in the urban cores of expensive cities may have negative rather than positive effects on
the relative size of minority populations. With only one major city center, I lack the data to say
anything about this hypothesis.
In Table 1.3 I decompose the effect of the linear zoning measure by focusing specifically on
the effect of allowing the construction of multi-family housing by right on the share of black
residents on the block. Limiting the sample to borders across which use changes from single to
multi-family dwellings leaves 1959 blocks that fall on 414 borders within 61 towns. The blocks
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are largely concentrated in the major cities of Boston, Springfield and Worcester, in smaller
satellite cities such as Brockton, Fall River, Lowell and in inner ring suburbs like Cambridge,
Brookline and Quincy. The land use regulation on the single-family blocks is predominately in
the highest density category.
Column 1 shows the estimated coefficient of a border fixed effects regression which finds an
impact of 3.36 percentage points that is significant at the 1 percent level. This is just over a
fifth of the average black population for blocks in this sample. We can break down multi-family
housing into low density (up to 8 units per acre), medium density (9 to 20 units per acre) and
high density (20 and above.) Column 2 shows that the point estimate is larger when crossing
from single family housing to medium and especially high density multi-family housing compared
to low density multi-family, though Wald tests can only reject equality of the high and low density
coefficients at the 10 percent level. Column 3 instead uses the sample of borders between different
classes of multi-family zoned housing and finds that moving from low density multi-family housing
(the omitted category) to medium and high density multi-family housing yields sizable positive
coefficients, though only the difference between low and high density is significant. These results
suggest that the largest differences in racial composition exist not between single and multi-family
blocks of similar densities, but rather between low-density multi-family blocks of triple-decker
houses and those with medium and high density apartment buildings.
Columns 4 and 5 turn to single family housing borders. A regression of the black share on
allowing single family housing in the highest density category (lot size under 15,000 square feet)
yields an insignificant coefficient, as does a regression of the black share on the linear density per
acre measure used above taken only in the single-family border sample. The confidence interval
allows me to rule out an effect in excess of 1.3 percentage points from permitting the densest
form of multi-family housing versus lot sizes of over an acre, though given the small average black
population in this sample of blocks (1.93 percent) that is not a very restrictive upper bound.
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Running a regression of the log share on log density in only the single-family sample also
yields an insignificant coefficient, though the point estimate of 0.16 log points is very similar to
the one found in the full sample. Though I cannot rule out substantial percentage gains as a
result of changes in density regulation, given the small initial share of blacks in the sample, even
at the upper end of the confidence interval, large changes in minimum lot size regulations are
likely to have at most modest impacts on the measured segregation of the black population.
Table 1.4 repeats the same set of regressions from Table 1.1 for Hispanics rather than blacks.
The patterns are largely similar, though the effects are slightly larger. An increase in allowable
density of one unit per acre corresponds to a 0.5 percent percentage point increase in the Hispanic
share of the block population, which averages 10 percent in the population and 9.2 percent in
the border sample. This is unaffected by the inclusion of controls for distance to the city and
presence of bodies of water. Turning to a logarithmic specification again requires dropping a
large portion of the sample because 46.5 percent of border blocks lack any Hispanic population,
but within the set of blocks that do have positive population, a 10 percent increase in zoned
units per acre leads to a 2.1 percent increase in the Hispanic share on the block. These effects
are roughly half the size of the effect of running OLS in the full sample without border fixed
effects, and smaller than town fixed effects estimates as well, again emphasizing the importance
of narrowly focusing on variation less confounded by town and neighborhood differences.
In Table 1.5 I decompose these effects between multi-family and single-family zones, and
find again that multi-family housing is driving the bulk of the impact. In the sample of borders
where zoned use changes between single-family and multi-family use, crossing the border to the
multi-family side yields a 5.77 percentage point impact in the Hispanic share, which is 43 percent
of the 13.56 percent mean Hispanic population in this sample of blocks. That is roughly twice
the size of the impact measured for the black share in Table 1.3.
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Column 2 decomposes the effect into three classes of multi-family housing and finds a
significant effect of moving from single-family housing to any of the three multi-family categories.
The impacts are larger in all categories than the effects seen for the black share, but particularly
striking is the comparative size of the low-density multi-family impact. For the black population
this effect was indistinguishable from zero, and the point estimate was below 1 percentage point,
whereas for Hispanics the effect is 3.4 percentage points and significant at the 5 percent level.
The coefficients for medium and high density multi-family housing are higher, though a Wald test
cannot reject equality between any pair of coefficients. Column 3 shows that at borders where
multi-family use changes I can detect an impact of moving from low-density to high-density
multi-family housing. Again, these results suggest that permitting medium and high density
multi-family housing leads to particularly large increases in the Hispanic share, but for the
Hispanic population, in contrast to blacks, zoning for low-density multi-family neighborhoods,
which in Massachusetts generally means triple-decker three-family housing, also leads to significant
increases in the population share.
Turning to single-family housing, Column 4 shows the impact of moving from low-density (lot
sizes one acre or larger) single-family zoning to medium and high-density (lot size less than 3/8
of an acre) single-family housing. The coefficient for high-density single-family is approaching
significance at the 5 percent level (p-value of .064) and the point estimate suggests an impact of
1.37 percentage points where the average Hispanic share in this sample of blocks is 3.24 percent.
Again, comparing the magnitude to the impacts seen for the black population, the size of the
Hispanic coefficients suggest that changes in land use regulation can have impacts on the Hispanic
share at lower density levels than would be expected for the black population. Nonetheless, given
the small initial Hispanic populations on blocks bordering low-density single-family zoning, it
seems unlikely that changes in minimum lot size regulations would have large impacts on the
overall levels of segregation in Massachusetts metro areas.
Some fair housing advocates have pointed to the restrictive land use regulation along the
relatively aﬄuent Route 128 corridor in Boston as having had particularly strong effects in
limiting the growth of suburban minority populations (Morse, 1975). Of course it could be
that even in the absence of restrictive land use regulation these towns would have low minority
26
populations. To investigate, I break the Boston portion of my sample down into four sub-regions,
one Boston and 9 inner ring suburbs comprising the urban core, one for the Route 128 Corridor
covering the west and northwest suburbs, and one each for suburbs north and south of the city
excluding some of the more distant shoreline communities that share little in common with the
neighboring jurisdictions. For a list of the cities included and a brief discussion of the construction
of each region see the Appendix.
In Table 1.6 I break down the impact of zoning on segregation within these 4 regions.
The upper half of the table shows the impact of permitting multi-family housing on minority
populations in the sample of borders where land use changes from single to multi-family residential.
The impact on the black share is remarkably consistent across regions, always falling between 3
and 5 percentage points. This is somewhat surprising seeing as the mean black population in the
four regions differs substantially, and suggests that permitting multi-family housing in any part
of the metro area is likely to have strong positive impact on the size of the black population. The
coefficient for the Hispanic population differs more between the four regions. Not surprisingly it
is largest in the North suburbs where concentrations of Hispanics are already high.
The bottom half of the table shows the impact of different classifications of single family
housing. As would be expected from the earlier tables, the impacts are small and generally
indistinguishable from 0, though impacts look slightly larger for both minority groups in the
northern suburbs than elsewhere. Surprisingly the impact of dense single family housing on the
Hispanic share in the Route 128 Corridor approaches significance at the 5 percent level (p-value
of .052). The results for any given subgroup are imprecise, but as a whole they are suggestive
that the estimates from the main regressions apply not only to areas close to the city center, but
to whiter and more aﬄuent suburban areas as well.
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1.5.1 Mechanisms
To better understand how land use regulation affects block racial composition, tables 1.7 and 1.8
explore the impact of zoning on the types of residential structures on the block in the Boston
metro area, omitting Boston where data is not available. Though block-level census data is only
informative about the total number of dwelling units and whether they are owned or rented,
parcel level assessment data subdivides the residential structures into six categories: single-family,
two-family, and three-family detached housing, small (4 to 8 unit) and large (9 or more unit)
apartment buildings and condominiums.
Because taxes are assessed to the owners of properties, houses and apartment buildings are
listed by building, whereas condos, where units are separately owned, are listed by unit. Some
towns report the number of units within an apartment building, but many do not. I can impute
the number of units in a building of a given type by regressing the total number of dwelling units
counted in the census on counts of each of the six building types at the block level in the full
block sample. Reassuringly, the coefficients for 1, 2, and 3 family houses from this regression
are almost exactly 1, 2 and 3 respectively, so that building a single family house on a block
corresponds to adding one dwelling unit to the block. The coefficient is roughly 5 for small
apartment buildings and 30 for large apartment buildings. For condominiums the coefficient is
around 0.75 indicating that there is some measurement error in that variable likely caused by
different buildings having different ownership structures. This suggests caution in interpreting
the condominium results. In general these imputations will lead to understated results if the size
of apartment buildings within categories is correlated with the prevalence of buildings across
categories, as is likely to be the case. For instance, if larger apartment buildings tend to be built
on blocks where more apartment buildings are built the imputation will understate the impact
of zoning regulations on the number of apartment units. Nonetheless, these regressions can be
informative about the underlying trends in building type connecting zoning regulation to racial
shares.
Table 1.7 shows the impact on total units and structure type of permitting multi-family
housing in the sample of blocks that lie on a border between single-family and multi-family zones.
I break multi-family zoning into two categories - low-density (3 to 8 units per acre) and medium
29
to high-density (9 units per acre and above) - as the regressions in the earlier tables suggested
different impacts for these two categories. Columns one and two show the impact on the overall
number of dwelling units per acre and the number of rental units per acre from census data.
Going from permitting single-family housing to permitting low-density multi-family housing
leads to 2.8 additional dwelling units per acre, and an increase of 2.1 additional rental units per
acre. Permitting high density multi-family housing increases the number of dwelling units by 7.4
units per acre and the number of rental units by 6.1 per acre.
Moving to columns 3 through 8 the sample drops as assessment data is only available for a
portion of the sample. Permitting low-density multi-family housing leads to a significant negative
impact of over one single-family residence per acre, and a significant positive impact of about
1 condo unit per acre. While not significant due to the limited sample size, the magnitudes of
the changes in other structure types are fairly large. Almost a full unit of two-family housing is
gained, and increases are also seen in the three other multi-family dwelling types. The impacts for
permitting multi-family housing show up particularly strongly for large multi-family apartment
units and condominium units, with small increases in three-family houses and small apartment
buildings, and decreases in one and two-family housing.
Table bottom panel of Table 1.7 repeats the same regressions, but this time for different
densities of single family zoning, using the single-family housing border sample. Permitting dense
(less than 3/8 acre lot sizes) single-family housing leads to 1.92 additional dwelling units per acre,
and 0.58 additional rental units compared to blocks with lot sizes of 1 acre or larger. Moving from
lot sizes over an acre to those between 3/8 and 1 acre yields an extra 0.56 total dwelling units,
but a trivial amount of new rental housing. Not surprisingly these impacts are concentrated in
increases in single, and in the case of high density single-family zoning, two-family residential
units.
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To connect this back to racial shares, in table 1.8 I regress the number of units for each
race on the types of housing on the block. Column 1 regresses total units on housing types
including border fixed effects for all blocks on borders. The results are what would be expected,
though the number of additional units from adding three-family houses looks closer to 2 in this
sample, suggesting some misclassification between 2 and 3 family houses in the data. Turning to
column 2, the results for blacks show that nearly all of the gains in black households that come
from crossing from one side of a border to another come from the presence of large apartment
buildings. This sheds light on the results from earlier tables showing that medium and high
density multi-family permitting are the only regulations that have significant impacts on the
share of the block population that is black.
For Hispanics in column 3 the coefficients on three-family and small apartment buildings are
also sizable, though the standard error for small apartments is too large to draw firm conclusions.
Nonetheless, this is consistent with the results above indicating that low-density multi-family
housing has strong impacts for the Hispanic population that are not seen for blacks. Column 4
provides the numbers for non-Hispanic whites to contrast them. Additional units of all types
increase the white population, not surprisingly since they make up 70 percent of the population,
but the relative impacts for whites versus minorities are much stronger in the single-family and
condominium categories than for apartment units.
We might again worry that these impacts of structure type on the size of minority populations
are driven by only the urban portion of the sample, and that building multi-family units might
have smaller impacts in more suburban locations. I rerun the same regressions in columns 5
through 8 for just the Route 128 corridor. Column 5 shows that the gains in units for each
category are roughly equal, but columns 6 and 7 show somewhat smaller increases for minority
groups than the ones in columns 2 and 3. Nonetheless, additional large apartment buildings
increase the black population, as do additional small and large apartments for Hispanics. The
impact of additional three-family houses, while still positive for Hispanics is smaller and not
distinguishable from zero with the power I have in this sample. Nonetheless, these results suggest
that building more multi-family housing, especially large apartment buildings, in the suburbs
does increase minority populations.
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Finally, I turn to data from the 1990 census to assess the impact of zoning regulations on
block-level racial composition changes over this period. Because I am using a single cross-section
of zoning regulations that are presumed to stay constant over the period it is not clear we should
expect much change in the impact of zoning on racial residential location patterns. However,
there are a few reasons to expect that there might be differences. First, it could be that even if
zoning regulations were put in place years earlier, that the composition of neighborhoods adjusts
slowly and that even by 1990 blocks had not reached their steady state equilibria. In this case
the primary interest would be in the 2010 level estimates, and the 1990 estimates would merely
serve to illustrate how slowly the process unfolds. Alternatively, it could be that as housing
demand by race changes over the period that the adjustment process differs between more and
less stringently zoned blocks. For instance, consider an influx of minorities to the area. It could
be that less stringently zoned neighborhoods are able to rapidly expand the stock of housing to
accommodate new migrants, whereas more restrictive blocks have a largely static population of
longer tenured residents.
First, in Table 1.9 I examine the impact of zoning regulation on the share of the population
that is black at the block level for 1990. Even though the geographic definition of blocks does not
stay constant over the period I can perform the same match for 1990 blocks to land use zones
as I did for 2010. Using the sample of border blocks in 1990 I attain an identical coefficient,
0.38 percentage points, for the impact of zoned units per acre on the share of the population
that is black as I did in the 2010 data. Column 3 shows that, among blocks with positive black
populations this represents a somewhat higher percentage increase, 25.9 percent versus 17.5
percent found in 1990.
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Columns 4 through 6 repeat regressions from Table 1.3 looking at the impact of multi-family
and single-family zoning independently for the 1990 sample. The 2.57 percentage point impact
of permitting any type of multi-family housing is similar, though slightly smaller than the
2010 coefficient, and the difference seems particularly apparent in the impact of high-density
multi-family housing in column 5. The impact of different minimum lot size restrictions among
single-family zones is negligible.
Repeating the same set of regressions for the Hispanic population in Table 1.10, I find that,
while the differences between Tables 1.4 and 1.10 imply that the impact of the linear density
measure has only grown modestly between 1990 and 2010, the impact of permitting multi-family
housing has doubled over the two decades. Comparing Table 1.5 to Table 1.10, the coefficient
on allowing multi-family housing jumps from 2.8 percentage points in 1990 (column 4 to 5.77
percentage points in 2010 (column 1 in Table 1.5). The coefficients for all three density classes of
multi-family housing see similar growth. The impact of changing the density of single-family
housing is small and insignificant in 1990, though the confidence intervals are large enough
compared to the effect that little can be said about any changes in the impact over time.
Along with comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated separately for the two
censuses, I can estimate the impacts of density on block-level changes over the period for the
sample of blocks I am able to match across censuses. Column 1 of Table 1.11 shows a regression
of the 2010 log share of the block’s population that is black on logged zoned units per acre and
the logged 1990 black population share with border fixed effects in the border sample. A log
point increase in zoned units per acre increases the black share by 0.169 log points, with a p-value
of 0.053, even controlling for the logged 1990 black share. This suggests that for blocks with
black populations in 1990, less restrictive land use regulation predicted somewhat quicker growth
in the black share of the population going forward.
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The coefficient of 0.425 on the 1990 black share itself suggests that a 10 percent higher black
share in 1990 led to a little over a 4 percent higher black share in 2010. The fact that this
coefficient is not closer to 1 likely reflects two things. First, given that both sides of the border are
similar along many neighborhood dimensions we would not necessarily expect the concentration
of blacks on one side of the border in 1990 to be a strong predictor of the concentration of blacks
20 years later, controlling for the impact of land use regulation. Second, since the geographic
block match leads to some measurement error we would expect this coefficient to be attenuated
compared to the true impact. Reassuringly, running a simple regression of the logged 2010
black share on the 1990 black share without controls in the full matched block sample yields a
coefficient close to one, suggesting that measurement error is not the only contributing factor.
Turning to columns 2 through 4, I find no significant impact of dummies for either permitting
of multi-family housing or higher densities of single family housing. There is not enough power
to distinguish what is driving the increase seen in column 1.
Looking at columns 5 through 8, the impacts of land use restrictions on the growth in the
Hispanic share at the block level between 1990 and 2010 are much larger. Column 5 shows that
a 10 percent increase in zoned units per acre leads to a 3.15 percent increase in the Hispanic
share, conditional on the logged 1990 Hispanic share. This coefficient is actually higher than
the coefficient on the logged 1990 Hispanic share itself, suggesting that there was substantial
movement of the Hispanic population across blocks on the same border. This is not surprising
given the substantial growth in the overall Hispanic population over the period. Even if incumbent
Hispanic residents stayed relatively immobile, if new residents’ location decisions are driven more
by attributes of the housing stock on either side of the border than the block-level Hispanic
share, then this is the pattern of coefficients we would expect.
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Breaking down this impact, permitting of multi-family housing has a large and significant
impact, and the impacts of different density classes of single family housing are large, but too
imprecisely estimated to be significant. Using the log zoned units per acre measure in the sample
of single-family borders approaches significance at the 5 percent level (p-value 0.061), suggesting
that zoning regulation along the entire spectrum of densities had some effect on Hispanic housing
choices.
Finally, in Column 9 I test whether blocks with less stringent zoning were able to add more
housing than more stringently zoned blocks across the border. Regressing the log of dwelling
units per acre in 2010 on log zoned units per acre and log dwelling units per acre in 1990, I find
that a 10 percent increase in allowed units per acre led to a 1.5 percent increase in dwelling
units per acre over the time period. This lends some support to the hypothesis that if minority
populations are growing in the area as a whole, more densely zoned blocks may be able to build
new housing more quickly to attract new minority residents. Probing this hypothesis further
would require individual level migration data.
1.6 Discussion
While the border design helps to reduce omitted variable bias, endogeneity may continue to
be a concern. It may be that places that had small black populations to begin with were
precisely the places where more restrictive zoning laws were put in place, as historians cited
above have argued. Any model that looks within towns, whether using town fixed effects or
the more restrictive border design, will mitigate this concern since the town is the level of
government writing zoning restrictions. In addition, some models motivating zoning legislation,
such as excluding those of lower incomes to avoid drain on local public finances, act at the town
rather than the neighborhood level. However, the concern might remain that the residents of
certain neighborhoods might lobby their local governments to preserve those neighborhoods
with zoning restrictions while allowing members of other races to move into other parts of the
jurisdiction that already had more minorities. However, given the narrow spatial focus here,
in order to violate the assumptions of the design there would need to be some reason why, in
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the absence of zoning regulation, block-level racial shares would not converge towards those
of directly adjacent blocks over time. Certainly when major roads, railroad lines or streams
mark the border between zones there is cause for concern that such boundaries would demarcate
racially segregated neighborhoods on their own. Given that I am dropping these borders from
the analysis the concern is somewhat lessened.
Also reassuring is that historical zoning maps for communities in the area such as Arlington,
Newton, Quincy and Sudbury show remarkable consistency over time. In Newton, though
the rules governing land use within each zone has changed over time, the borders themselves
are nearly identical to those that appear on a 1921 zoning map. Similarly, the boundaries of
Sudbury’s residential zones remain unchanged since they were originally drawn in 1955. The
list of zone changes since 1976 in Quincy numbers in the hundreds, but in nearly all cases these
are not changes from one residential classification to another, but rather changes in zoning for
commercial and conservation purposes that are not part of this analysis. Though a more rigorous
historical examination is surely a worthy endeavor, the relative stability of these regulations over
long time periods in the subset of towns for which data is readily available lends credibility to
the approach taken here.
Along with the strengths of the border design come a couple of caveats about the local
average treatment effects estimated using this model. A long literature explores the impact of
residents’ racial preferences on housing market equilibria (see, for example, Schelling (1971);
Cutler et al. (1999); Card et al. (2008).) If the impact of changing zoning regimes is to change
the racial composition of the neighborhood, then that change may itself beget further changes in
neighborhood composition through the interaction of preferences for neighbors in the housing
market. Since the underlying assumption of the border fixed effects design is that neighborhood
attributes stay constant across the zoning border, this effect, by assumption, should be equal
on either side and will therefore be absorbed by the border fixed effects. In light of this, the
estimates here are best seen as lower bounds for the overall impact that changes in zoning
regulations will have over time. What is being isolated here is the variation that acts through
the mechanisms discussed earlier; that is, through changing housing types and proportion of
home ownership, price changes that result directly from zoning and the stasis effect of slowing
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down new construction. Incorporating the spillover effect to the neighborhood could be achieved
by adding more structure to the model such as is done in Bayer et al. (2007) and Kasy (2012),
but doing so requires individual level data that is unavailable here. Alternatively, one could
return to a larger unit of geography such as the metro area where the unit of observation is
sufficiently large as to rule out spillovers beyond its bounds, though at the risk of inviting back
in the confounding factors discussed in the review of prior literature.
Furthermore, as with any local average treatment effect, caution should be taken in extrapo-
lating these results to other contexts. Boston in particular has some of the strictest land use
regulations in the country as measured both by Pendall (2000) and the Wharton Residential
Land Use Survey, and it would be interesting to see how the micro-level estimates compare in
regions with a less extreme distribution of zoning. Another unique feature in Massachusetts is
Regulation 40B, a statewide statute that allows developers to seek state authorization to override
local zoning authority in communities where less than 10 percent of housing is deemed affordable
in exchange for maintaining at least 20 percent of the new units as affordable (Fisher, 2008).
The threat of this law has also motivated some municipalities to enact their own inclusionary
zoning laws to achieve the same outcomes with more local control. However, according to an
examination of these policies by Schuetz et al. (2009) these laws have led to only modest levels
of production of affordable housing, with only about a fifth of communities reporting any new
housing built under their inclusionary zoning laws. If communities made widespread use of these
regulations the evidence I find from zoning borders might be attenuated compared to what would
be found in places without such regulations, but Schuetz’s work suggests that perhaps the lost
revenue from having to set aside affordable units mutes the impact of these laws.
Even within Massachusetts, the estimates are only informative about places that look like
those that fall along zoning borders. Allowing construction of multi-family apartment buildings
may have quite different effects if enacted in a rural area zoned entirely for an agricultural and
residential mix than it would in places that border currently extant multi-family zones. The
heterogeneity analysis showing strong impacts even in suburban areas such as the Route 128
Corridor is reassuring here, but that may mask variability within that region between places close
to and far away from multi-family districts. Fortunately, the margins likely to be relevant for
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policy are precisely those along which the impacts are being identified in the data as communities
are most likely to enact small policy changes by moving one or two lot size categories or from
higher density single family to permitting of multi-family housing.
Proceeding with caution given these caveats, I conclude the analysis by seeing what my results
imply about the impact of zoning on area level segregation measures. One way of assessing this
is to take my estimates of the impact of zoning on block level log population growth by race and
simulate the impact of equalizing zoning regulation across the area. This should not be thought
of as a policy simulation, since nobody is suggesting that the areas towards the city center are
going to substantially reduce zoning density to meet the suburbs at the halfway point. Rather
this is an attempt to estimate segregation in the absence of zoning variation while keeping the
area’s overall minority populations constant.
I measure metro area level segregation using the dissimilarity index at the tract level. For
two racial groups, the dissimilarity index measures the percentage of one group that would have
to move in order for that group’s tract-level share of the population to be equal across the area.
This is a common measure in the sociology and economics literature on segregation, and is the
measure used by Rothwell and Massey (2009) in their papers on the impact of zoning regulation.
Table 1.12 shows the dissimilarity index for blacks and non-blacks across the largest 88
metropolitan areas with populations over 600,000 in the 2010 census as calculated by Glaeser
and Vigdor (2012). Boston ranks 27th with a dissimilarity index of 57.6, while Springfield is 35th
at 55.7 and Worcester is 55th at 47.3. Because my data only includes the Massachusetts portion
of the Boston metro area I measure a slightly smaller value of 56.4 for Boston’s dissimilarity
index. I also use the updated 2013 redefinition of the Springfield metro area which removes the
largely rural Franklin County and modestly lowers the dissimilarity index to 54.5. Neither of
these changes affects the relative ranking of the cities by more than 1 place on the list.
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Rank Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Population
1 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 0.777 1,555,908
2 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 0.735 4,296,250
3 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 0.719 9,461,105
4 Cleveland-Elyria, OH 0.715 2,077,240
5 St. Louis, MO-IL 0.71 2,787,701
6 Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 0.699 1,135,509
7 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 0.68 2,114,580
8 Dayton, OH 0.656 799,232
9 Pittsburgh, PA 0.649 2,356,285
10 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 0.647 19,567,410
11 Syracuse, NY 0.646 662,577
12 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 0.643 1,128,047
13 Toledo, OH 0.63 610,001
13 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 0.63 1,887,877
15 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 0.626 5,965,343
16 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 0.622 2,710,489
17 Rochester, NY 0.616 1,079,671
18 Columbus, OH 0.603 1,901,974
19 New Orleans-Metairie, LA 0.597 1,189,866
20 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 0.591 1,324,829
20 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 0.591 988,938
22 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 0.588 865,350
23 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.585 870,716
24 Akron, OH 0.583 703,200
25 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 0.581 5,564,635
26 Kansas City, MO-KS 0.577 2,009,342
27 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 0.576 4,552,402
28 Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 0.567 2,543,482
29 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 0.563 1,212,381
30 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 0.562 1,235,708
30 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 0.562 916,829
32 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 0.561 5,636,232
33 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 0.56 699,757
34 Baton Rouge, LA 0.559 802,484
35 Springfield, MA 0.557 621,570
36 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 0.545 618,754
36 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 0.545 12,828,837
38 New Haven-Milford, CT 0.544 862,477
39 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 0.541 5,286,728
40 Knoxville, TN 0.529 837,571
41 Wichita, KS 0.528 630,919
42 Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 0.525 1,670,890
43 Tulsa, OK 0.517 937,478
44 Winston-Salem, NC 0.512 640,595
Notes: Data are from Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor's “The End of the Segregated Century: Racial 
Separation in America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010.” Mannhattan Institute Civic Report, January 2012.
Table 1.12: Segregation Across US Metro Areas, 2010
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Rank Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Population
45 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 0.505 4,335,391
46 Jacksonville, FL 0.504 1,345,596
46 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.504 2,783,243
48 North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 0.503 702,281
49 Greensboro-High Point, NC 0.498 723,801
50 Richmond, VA 0.496 1,208,101
51 Oklahoma City, OK 0.487 1,252,987
52 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 0.48 3,348,859
53 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 0.478 5,920,416
54 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 0.475 6,426,214
55 Worcester, MA-CT 0.473 916,980
56 Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 0.472 1,600,852
57 Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 0.471 2,217,012
58 Columbia, SC 0.464 767,598
59 Madison, WI 0.461 605,435
60 Honolulu, HI 0.451 953,207
61 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 0.449 1,676,822
62 Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA 0.445 2,149,127
63 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 0.435 2,134,411
64 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 0.43 3,439,809
65 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 0.423 2,226,009
66 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 0.421 2,142,508
67 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 0.418 821,173
68 Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC 0.415 824,112
69 Bakersfield, CA 0.401 839,631
70 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 0.397 602,095
71 Fresno, CA 0.391 930,450
72 Charleston-North Charleston, SC 0.39 664,607
73 Raleigh, NC 0.386 1,130,490
73 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 0.386 3,095,313
75 El Paso, TX 0.385 804,123
76 Austin-Round Rock, TX 0.382 1,716,289
77 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.341 774,769
78 Colorado Springs, CO 0.34 645,613
79 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 0.326 4,224,851
80 Salt Lake City, UT 0.322 1,087,873
81 Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.314 685,306
82 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 0.312 4,192,887
83 Tucson, AZ 0.293 980,263
84 Boise City, ID 0.284 616,561
85 Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 0.281 1,951,269
86 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 0.253 1,836,911
87 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 0.244 823,318
88 Albuquerque, NM 0.243 887,077
Table 1.12: Segregation Across US Metro Areas, 2010 (continued)
Notes: Data are from Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor's “The End of the Segregated Century: Racial 
Separation in America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010.” Mannhattan Institute Civic Report, January 2012.
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To simulate the removal of zoning regulation I calculate the average zoned units per acre at
the metro and tract level using the block level data. The average densities for the Springfield,
Worcester and Boston areas are 4.63, 5.03 and 7.22 respectively, roughly the average number
of units observed for dense single family housing. Using my coefficient from the first column
of Table 1.2, I multiply the difference between the tract average and the metro area average
by .0038 percentage points and add that to the original black population. This results in
a dissimilarity index for Boston of 49.9, with Springfield only modestly affected at 52.7 and
Worcester plummeting to 32.9, which would be among the lowest values observed in the data.
The change for Boston is substantial; the simulated value would take Boston from being the 27th
ranked to the 48th ranked metro area in dissimilarity. Its neighbors in that region of the table,
Dallas, Houston and Oklahoma City, are among the least regulated metro areas in the country
according to the average Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index, whereas Boston is
ranked second. The simulation suggests that as much as three quarters of the Boston to Houston
gap could be accounted for by land use regulation alone. On the other hand, the estimate is
much smaller than that of Rothwell and Massey, whose results suggested that moving from the
most to least restrictive zoning regime could have an impact on the dissimilarity index as large
as 0.23 points.
1.7 Conclusion
Do strict density regulations have an exclusionary impact on minority populations in stringently
zoned neighborhoods? The results I present here for Massachusetts suggest that they do. For each
additional unit allowed per acre, the black share of the population increases by 0.38 percentage
points and the Hispanic share increases by 0.5 percentage points. The impact of permitting
multi-family housing is particularly strong, with the black share increasing by 3.38 percentage
points and the Hispanic share by 5.77 percentage points. By estimating the impacts using only
areas along zoning borders I am able to control for potentially omitted town and neighborhood
effects, isolating the variation coming from moving from a block on one side of a zoning boundary
to another. This paper is the first in this literature to isolate such narrow spatial variation.
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Future work is necessary to confirm the validity of these results in contexts beyond Mas-
sachusetts, and to disentangle the mechanisms driving the results. Of particular interest is the
intersection between race and socioeconomic status. While block level census data are available
by race, no income measures are available making it difficult to separate income from the other
channels by which land use regulation might influence racial location. Given that much of the
impact is mediated through changes in the types of structures built, and that the proportion of
minorities owning homes lags whites even within income categories, it is unlikely the entire result
can be explained by income alone. Nonetheless, income surely plays a substantial role. Even
aside from any racial interaction, the effect of zoning on segregation by income and educational
attainment are worthy of study in their own right.
While changes in the dissimilarity index tend not to fit themselves neatly into canonical social
welfare functions, these results may be of interest to policymakers who see lower (or higher)
levels of racial segregation as a desirable outcome. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development issued new guidelines in July 2013 with the goal of “Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing” and has threatened to withhold block grant money from New York’s Westchester
County, among others, due to “restrictive practices” such as limits on density and building types
it sees as racially and ethnically exclusionary. Angered by what he sees as federal overreach,
a Westchester County Executive penned a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed (Astorino, 2013) asking
residents whether they “think it is a good idea to give the Department of Housing and Urban
Development unchecked authority to put an apartment building in your neighborhood.” While
the results here cannot tell us about the desirability of such a federal policy, they do imply that
it would likely result in a substantial decrease in racial segregation.
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Chapter 2
The Complementarity Between
Cities and Skills1
2.1 Introduction
The connection between area size and per worker productivity and income is a core fact at the
center of urban economics (Glaeser, 2008). The connection between urban density and earnings
is understood to be a primary reason that cities exist. Understanding the connection between
city size and productivity is a core task for students of agglomeration.
This paper notes that the connection between city size and productivity does not hold for
less skilled metropolitan areas in the United States today. In the least well-educated third of
metropolitan areas, there is virtually no connection between city size and productivity or income.
In the most well-educated third of metropolitan areas, area population can explain 45 percent of
the variation in per-worker productivity.
Why does productivity increase with area population for skilled places, but not for unskilled
places? One hypothesis is that the connection between productivity and area size reflects a
tendency of more skilled people to locate in big cities. However, even in the more skilled places,
controlling for area-level skills can only explain a quarter of the measured agglomeration effect.
If unobserved skills were explaining the correlation, then we would expect real wages to rise with
1Co-authored with Edward L. Glaeser.
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city population, which they do, but that effect seems to explain only 30 percent of the connection
between city size and income or productivity.
We divide the theories of agglomeration into two broad categories: those that emphasize the
spread of knowledge in cities and those that do not. Among the latter group is the view that
cities are more productive because of advantages unrelated to agglomeration, such as access to
ports or harbors or good government, and the possibility that capital is more abundant in big
cities. Nonknowledge-based theories also include standard agglomeration models, where urban
proximity reduces transport costs. In Section 2.3, we address these theories. While there is little
evidence that directly supports these hypotheses, there is little evidence with which to reject
them either. In Section 2.4, we turn to two core knowledge-based theories of urban agglomeration,
which can both readily explain why the productivity-city size connection is so much stronger in
higher human capital metropolitan areas.
The first hypothesis, which comes from Marshall (1890)’s statement that in agglomerations
the “mysteries of the trade” are “in the air,” is that density makes it easier for workers to learn
from each other. The second hypothesis is that high levels of human capital and city size interact
to push out the frontier of knowledge and the level of productivity. While these two hypotheses
predict similar things about the links between productivity, human capital and city size, two
natural versions of the theories have different implications for wage growth in skilled cities. The
learning interpretation suggests that age-earnings profiles should be steeper in big, skilled areas,
because workers are learning more rapidly. One version of the innovation interpretation implies
that age-earnings profiles in such places are flatter, because technological change is proceeding
rapidly and making the skills of older people obsolete. This implication requires the added
assumption that technological change causes some skills to become out of date.
As in Glaeser and Mare (2001), we find some evidence supporting the view that workers learn
more quickly in metropolitan areas. We also find that this learning effect is stronger in more
skilled areas. However, we do not find that age-earnings profiles are steeper in bigger metropolitan
areas, and the interaction between area size, area skills, and experience is insignificant. While
these findings are quite compatible with the view that cities and skills are complements, they do
not clearly indicate whether this complementarity works through learning, innovation, both or
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neither.
The natural implication of the view that cities and human capital are complements is that
cities will become more, not less, important if humanity continues acquiring knowledge. The
importance of connecting in dense urban areas will only increase if knowledge becomes more
important, at least as long as technological shifts do not eliminate the urban edge in transferring
information.
2.2 The Interaction Between Skills And City Population
We begin with metropolitan area-level correlations between size, skills, and productivity since
Gross Metropolitan Product numbers are available at the area, but not the individual, level. We
then turn to individual-level regressions that use income data and individual controls. Figure
2.1 illustrates the well-known connection between city size and productivity per worker. In this
figure, productivity per worker is calculated as the ratio of Gross Metropolitan Product in 2001
(as calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis) to the total labor force. The raw elasticity is
0.13, meaning that as population increases by 100 percent, productivity rises by nine percent. Of
course, one part of this connection is that bigger metropolitan areas do seem to have more skilled
workers, as shown in Figure 2.2. The tendency of more skilled people to live in metropolitan
areas might reflect a greater demand of more skilled people for urban amenities, or perhaps that
cities disproportionately increase the productivity of more skilled workers. These two theories
can be distinguished; if this connection reflected a demand for amenities it would mean that
cities are skilled because of abundant labor supply, and we should expect to see lower wages for
skilled workers in big cities (Glaeser, 2008). A naive attempt to control for the share of adults
with college degrees at the metropolitan area level yields the following regression
(2.1)Log(OutputPerWorker) = 9.49 + 0.098 ∗ Log(Population) + 1.18 ∗ PctBA
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 Figure 2.1: Output per Worker and Area Size  
 
Figure 2.2: Area Skill and Area Size 
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Output per worker continues to be gross metropolitan product divided by the size of the
labor force. The R2 is 0.47 and there are 335 observations. The coefficient on log of population
declines slightly, from 0.13 to 0.098, roughly a 25 percent decline. Just controlling for human
capital eliminates about one-quarter of the connection between area population and output per
worker.
But it appears that the effects of human capital and city size are not independent. When we
interact the two variables, we estimate
(2.2)Log(OutputPerWorker) = 0.08 ∗ Log(Pop) + 1.26 ∗ PctBA+ 0.51 ∗ Log(Pop) ∗ PctBA
The final refers to the product of log of area population (demeaned) and share with college
degrees (also demeaned). An intercept was included in the estimation but is not reported for
space reasons. The R2 is now 0.49. The demeaning of the variables means that both raw
coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of the variable, when the other variable has taken on
its mean level. The interaction means that when the share with college degrees is at its minimum
observed value of 0.09 (which would be .0.13 relative to the mean), the estimated coefficient on
population is just 0.01, whereas for the maximum value of 0.52, the estimated effect is 0.23. If we
instead run this regression with the logarithm of per capita income, we estimate coefficients of
0.026 on the log of population, 1.43 on share of the population with college degrees and 0.42 on
the interaction. In this income specification, the t-statistic on the interaction is 4.5. If we use log
of median family income as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients are 0.019, 1.55 and
0.36 on the three variables. The t-statistic on the interaction remains over 4. Our independent
variables are certainly endogenous, and we have no perfect source of exogenous variation that
solves this problem. However, similar results appear if we use variables from 1940 (population,
share with college degrees, and the interaction) instead of contemporaneous variables to explain
current gross metropolitan product. In that case, we estimate
(2.3)Log(OutputPerWorker) = 0.07 ∗ Log(Pop) + 5.04 ∗ PctBA+ 2.47 ∗ Log(Pop) ∗ PctBA
In this case, there are 334 observations and the R2 is 0.34. The high coefficient on the lagged
share of the population with college degrees reflects, in part, the tendency of skilled places to
become more skilled over time, as discussed in Berry and Glaeser (2005).
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In individual-level regressions, which control for individual-level human capital and experience,
our results weaken significantly. The first regression of Table 2.1 shows the 0.041 coefficient when
individual yearly log earnings are regressed on metropolitan area size (also found in Glaeser and
Gottlieb (2008). This coefficient is less than one-half of the baseline coefficient estimated in the
aggregate gross metropolitan product regression. Controlling for the share of the population with
college degrees pushes the coefficient down further to 0.028. In the third regression, we show
that the interaction between population and the share with college degrees is positive, although
significant only at the 10 percent level.
The individual-level results are qualitatively similar to those above although weaker in
magnitude. The differences between the individual and aggregate regressions reflect primarily the
fact that the aggregate results are weakest for the largest metropolitan areas, which are weighted
heavily in these individual-level regressions. The regression in column 4 repeats the regression
in 3 weighting by the inverse of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) population (so smaller
metropolitan areas get more weight). In this case, the results look similar to the aggregate
results.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the interaction between output per worker and metropolitan
area population graphically. Figure 2.3 shows this relationship in the 100 least well-educated
metropolitan areas with populations over 100,000. Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between
metropolitan area population and output per worker in the 100 most well-educated areas with
populations over 100,000. Among less well-educated places, there is essentially no agglomeration
effect. In the most well-educated places, population can explain 45 percent of the variation
in productivity. In these well-educated places, including further controls for education has
virtually no effect on the city size effect, so the measured coefficient of 0.13 is the same with or
without controlling for human capital. The same basic pattern appears with different measures
of earnings, such as per capita income or median family income. In high human capital cities,
the agglomeration effect is strong. In low human capital cities, it is weak or nonexistent.2
2Interestingly, there is significant cross effect between city human capital and city size in the population growth
context.While highly skilled cities grow more swiftly than less skilled areas (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Shapiro, 2006),
this effect is not larger in bigger areas.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MSA-Level Covariates:
Log of MSA 0.041 0.028 0.022 0.038 0.034 0.044 0.021
Population [0.011]*** [0.011]** [0.012]* [0.006]*** [0.016]** [0.019]** [0.018]
Share of MSA Adults 0.639 0.411 0.208 0.415 -0.11 -0.895
with a BA [0.144]*** [0.122]*** [0.086]** [0.123]*** [0.318] [0.287]***
0.196 0.413 0.193 0.193 0.885
[0.113]* [0.087]*** [0.113]* [0.113]* [0.229]***
Individual-MSA Interactions:
-0.004 -0.007 0
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
0.18 0.448
[0.095]* [0.086]***
Log Exp* Log MSA Pop* -0.236
MSA BA Share [0.057]***
Individual-Level Covariates:
Log Experience 0.25 0.252 0.252 0.251 0.258 0.256 0.254
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
Education Dummies:
0-9 years -0.59 -0.587 -0.586 -0.584 -0.586 -0.585 -0.585
[0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
10-11 years -0.33 -0.327 -0.327 -0.319 -0.327 -0.327 -0.326
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]***
13-15 years 0.207 0.204 0.204 0.179 0.204 0.204 0.204
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
16 years 0.575 0.565 0.566 0.516 0.566 0.566 0.566
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]***
17+ years 0.788 0.774 0.774 0.717 0.774 0.774 0.775
[0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
Constant 9.409 9.406 9.406 9.41 9.388 9.394 9.401
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]***
Weighted NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 2102175 2102175 2102175 2102175 2102175 2102175 2102175
R-Squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17
Notes: All variables derived from US Census, with the individual level data accessed through the IPUMS. 
Weights are inverse population weights, such that the each MSA gets equal weight. Standard errors are clustered 
at the MSA level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Log Pop * BA Share
Table 2.1: Log Annual Income on City Population and Education Levels 
interacted with Individual Experience and Education Levels
Log of Annual Income
Log Exp * Log MSA Pop
Log Exp * MSA BA Share
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 Figure 2.3: Productivity and Area Size in Less Skilled MSAs 
 
Figure 2.4: Productivity and Area Size in More Skilled MSAs 
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One hypothesis is that the connection between cities and productivity represents omitted
skills that are either obtained before working or learned on the job. It could certainly be possible
that the connection between city size and productivity is higher in skilled cities because the
correlation between skills and population is particularly strong in such places.3 We will address
the theory that cities enhance skill acquisition later. Here, we just discuss the possibility that
the urban wage premium reflects preexisting skills. After all, as Bacalod et al. (2010) emphasize,
skills are far more than years of education. Glaeser and Mare (2001) do a fair amount of work
showing that the urban wage premium (as opposed to the more continuous correlation between
city size and productivity or earnings) survives a large number of measures of individual human
capital, such as test scores and instrumental variables approaches that use parental state of birth
characteristics.
One of their pieces of evidence supporting the view that omitted pre-market human capital
variables are not higher in cities is that real wages, that is, wages controlling for local price
levels, do not rise significantly in urban areas. If people in cities had higher levels of innate
human capital, then they should be earning higher real wages as well as higher nominal wages.
After all, they are more skilled. Of course, estimated real wages would need to be adjusted for
local amenities, and amenities may be either higher or lower in large urban areas.4 Glaeser and
Mare (2001) find little connection between city size and real wages in their sample of cities. In
our considerably larger sample, we also find little connection between the log of median family
income, divided by the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association local price index,
and city population, at least once we control for the share of the population with college degrees.
However, this result is not true in the more skilled cities where agglomeration elasticities are
strongest. For example, if we look only at those areas where the share of population with college
degrees is greater than 25.025 percent (the same cutoff used to establish the top 100 skilled cities
above), we find that
3If skills were learned in big cities, then more human capital in big cities would lead to more learning in the
model of Glaeser (1999). If skills were preexisting, then it would be possible that omitted aspects of human capital
were more important at the high end of the skill distribution which is overrepresented in skilled places.
4Glaeser (2008), Chapter 3, presents a lengthy discussion of the spatial equilibrium, RosenRoback model,
which underlies this logic.
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(2.4)Log(RealFamilyIncome) = 9.07 + 0.025 ∗ Log(Population) + 1.00 ∗ PctBA
There are 100 observations and the R2 is 0.27. All data come from the Census except for the
price indices used to turn nominal into real income, which come from the American Chamber of
Commerce Research Association.5
Real incomes rise significantly with skills, which is compatible with the view that more
skilled people are more productive. While real incomes do not rise with city size, across the
entire population, in these skilled areas, there is a positive connection. This connection can be
interpreted as either implying that there is a greater level of unobserved human capital in these
areas or that these bigger cities are particularly unpleasant and higher wages are compensation
for negative amenities. However, controlling for some obvious amenities, such as temperature,
does little to change this result, and we have trouble believing that there are more negative
amenities in big skilled cities than in big unskilled cities.6
If the coefficient on city size is treated as a measure of the extent to which unobserved skills
rise with city size in this skilled city subsample, this would mean that about 30 percent of the
urban productivity coefficient could be explained by human capital (0.025/0.08).7. Since observed
human capital is uncorrelated with city size in this subsample, this is a plausible measure of the
extent to which human capital explains the city size effect in these cities. In the larger sample
that includes skilled and unskilled cities, bigger cities do have higher observed levels of human
capital, and controlling for skills can explain about one-quarter of the connection between city
size and productivity, but there is little sign that unobserved human capital is higher in bigger
metropolitan areas in that larger sample of cities. In either case, human capital appears to
explain at most 30 percent of the city size effect, leaving at least 70 percent to be explained.8
5A better procedure would be to use individual-level data and individual-level price controls as in Moretti
(2013).
6For example, the problem of urban crime is particularly prevalent in less skilled metropolitan areas.
7Note that this real-wage method would only get at exogenous unobserved skills. If cities created unobserved
skills endogenously, then in a spatial equilibrium, workers should end up paying for those skills with higher costs
of living (Glaeser and Mare, 2001)
8Combes et al. (2008) find that unobserved skills can explain up to one half of the connection between
agglomeration size and wages in France. The discrepancy between their results and our results here might reflect
differences between the United States and France or their use of individual fixed effects to control for unobserved
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Understanding why the city size effect is larger in skilled places seems particularly pressing.
2.3 Urban Productivity Framework
We now use a standard production function to consider alternative interpretations of our
agglomeration results.9 In a standard production function, output per worker can be written as
PAF (K,hL)/L, where P is the price of the good, A is the level of productivity, K is the level
of capital, and hL reflects the amount of effective labor, with h as human capital and L as the
number of workers. If the production function is homogenous of degree one, which is necessary
for a zero-profit equilibrium, then output per worker can be rewritten as PAF (k, h), where k
reflects physical capital per worker and h reflects human capital. If the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, with parameter β on labor, then differentiating this quantity with respect to any
exogenous variable Z, such as city population, yields the following decomposition:
(2.5)∂OutputPerWorker∂Log(Z) =
∂Log(P )
∂Log(Z) +
∂Log(A)
∂Log(Z) + (1− β) ∂Log(k)∂Log(Z) + β ∂Log(h)∂Log(Z)
Wages per worker equal the wage per effective unit of human capital times the amount of
human capital per worker. In a standard Cobb-Douglas formulation, wages per worker equal β
times output per worker.
To close the model, capital and labor should also be endogenized. If workers are to be
indifferent across locations, which is a necessary condition for the existence of a spatial equilibrium
(Glaeser, 2008), then high costs of living must offset high wages. But that fact does not change
the fact that high wages must also be offset by something making firms more productive, and
our focus is on this latter relationship.
The connection between output per worker and city size could represent an increase in
prices, productivity, capital per worker, or human capital per worker, in big cities. The relative
importance of the different forces will surely differ across industries. Barbers will have a higher
output per worker in bigger cities, but much of that difference will reflect higher prices, not
capital per worker, or even human capital. Conversely, the prices of traded manufactured goods
skills.
9Puga (2010) provides a more thorough discussion of the different sources of agglomeration economies.
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are more or less constant over space, and any variation in output per worker in that industry is
likely to reflect productivity or capital, either physical or human.
We will divide up these theories into two sets of hypotheses. One set of theories emphasizes
greater knowledge in cities, which could mean higher levels of h or a higher level of A brought
on by the urban exchange of ideas.We will address that set of theories in the next section. The
other set of theories focuses on other causes of urban productivity, which include innate urban
advantages, such as access to waterways or good government, higher levels of capital per worker,
and non-knowledge-based agglomeration economies.
Conceptually, it would be quite possible for the strong connection between city size and
productivity to reflect omitted characteristics of a location that both enhance productivity and
attract workers. In the 19th century, it seems undebatable that the waterways of New York and
Chicago made these places economically successful and attracted people to them (Glaeser, 2005).
Yet few urbanists believe that locational advantages have much direct impact on productivity
today.10 Cities long ago gave up on those industries that were tied to their local geography.
Today, cities are more likely to specialize in business services (Kolko and Neumark, 2008), and it
is hard to see how those services get an edge from a harbor or a coal mine. Natural advantages
seem to explain only 25 percent of the concentration of manufacturing industries (Ellison and
Glaeser, 1999).
We are less sure that natural advantage is irrelevant in explaining the connection between
city size and productivity, but it seems unlikely that any natural advantages can explain why
that connection is stronger in more skilled cities. After all, many of these natural advantages
would seem to have their largest impact on less skilled industries. Indeed, that is exactly what a
cursory examination of the data reveals. Variables like proximity to the great lakes or harbors
positively impact productivity in less skilled places, but have no impact in more skilled areas.
For example, the correlation between per capita income and miles from the nearest body of
water is 0.33 for less educated cities and 0.03 for more educated cities. If this result holds more
generally, and innate advantage matters more for less skilled workers, then the fact that city
10Combes et al. (2010) use historical sources of innate advantage as instruments for current population density,
which requires that these variables be orthogonal to current productivity.
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size increases productivity more for places with more skills is evidence against the importance of
such natural advantages.
One way in which natural advantage might matter today is that past historical natural
advantages might have led to more investment in physical capital. Typically, physical capital is
treated as endogenous and for that reason, not really a plausible determinant of agglomeration
economies. For example, in the model sketched above, if purchased by producers at a cost r,
which might differ across space, then a Cobb-Douglas relationship would imply that:
(2.6)∂OutputPerWorker∂Log(Z) =
1
β (
∂Log(P )
∂Log(Z) +
∂Log(A)
∂Log(Z))− (1−β)β ∂Log(r)∂Log(Z) + ∂Log(h)∂Log(Z)
If physical capital is endogenously determined, then it can only increase the connection
between city size and output per worker if capital is cheaper in big, dense cities. Typically,
evidence on real estate costs would suggest that capital is, if anything more expensive in big
cities, which reflects the greater scarcity of land.
However, if big cities have long invested in durable physical capital, then that capital might
remain and might increase productivity today. Certainly, casual observation of cities such as
New York, London, and Paris suggests that they have advantages that come from centuries of
public and private investment in physical capital. Is there any evidence to support this view?
Unfortunately, there is little good measurement of physical capital at the metropolitan area
level. A few heroic social scientists, such as Munnell (1991) and Garofalo and Yamarik (2002)
have created state-level estimates of the capital stock, but these estimates have been based
on apportioning the national capital stock to states on the basis of the types of industries in
those states.11 At the state level, for manufacturing industries, the Census of Manufacturers
provides an estimate of expenditures on capital. These numbers are problematic in two ways:
they represent an estimate of the flow of investment not the stock of capital and they address
only manufacturing.
11A similar procedure could be used at the metropolitan area level, but we doubt that it would be seen as
particularly compelling to suggest that New York Citys capital stock is the same as the nation, except for its mix
of major industries.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-Level Density 0.585 0.787 0.559 0.458 0.551 0.342
[0.304] [0.314] [0.337] [0.178] [0.188] [0.192]
Log Capital Per Worker 0.244 0.112
[0.132] [.0789]
Years of Schooling 0.0177 0.0775
[0.0911] [.0518]
Constant 4.339 3.516 4.137 2.297 1.919 1.416
[0.397] [0.588] [1.111] [0.233] [0.351] [0.632]
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-Squared 0.096 0.178 0.097 0.158 0.205 0.21
Log Value Added Log Wage
Table 2.2: State-Level Density and Output
Notes: State-level density and years of schooling from Ciconne and Hall (1996). Log value added, log 
wage and log capital per worker from 2006 Annual Survey of Manufacturers. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.
Figure 2.5: Value Added Per Worker and Physical Capital
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While there is certainly a robust relationship between capital expenditures and value added
per worker, shown in Figure 2.5, controlling for capital expenditures only increases the relationship
between state-level density and value added per worker or income. Table 2.2 shows the relationship
between the Ciccone and Hall (1996) index of state-level density and two measures of output:
value added per worker and hourly wage for production workers for states with more than 50,000
manufacturing workers. Columns 2 and 4 show the increased connection between output and
density when a control for capital expenditures is added. The raw correlation between capital
expenditures and density is negative. These results should not lead us to think that the capital
stock explanation for urban productivity is disproved, but rather that this sliver of available
evidence does not support that hypothesis. In columns 3 and 6, we include controls for years of
schooling taken, for comparability reasons, also from Ciccone and Hall (1996). Schooling has
a tiny and insignificant impact on value added per worker, and a larger but still insignificant
effect on the hourly wage. Controlling for schooling reduces the coefficient on density in the wage
regression, but not the value-added regression, because education seems to influence wages more
than value added.
Still, this evidence only informs us about current expenditures, not the stock of accumulated
urban capital. We know of no good measures of such historical investment, but we can at least
ask whether historical development eliminates either the current link between population and
productivity or the interaction between that variable and the share of the population with college
degrees. Including the logarithm of population in 1900 as a control in regression 2.2 yields
(2.7)Log(OutputPerWorker) = 0.72 ∗ Log(Pop2000) + 1.23 ∗ PctBA+ 0.53
∗ Log(Pop2000) ∗ PctBA+ 0.15 ∗ Log(Pop1900)
There are many problems with this regression, including the fact that population growth
between 1900 and today is hardly random, but its results give little hope to the view that historical
investment in capital stock explains either the basic agglomeration effect or the interaction between
education and population. Neither coefficient is substantially changed from Equation 2.2. We
have also experimented using geographic instruments, like proximity to the Great Lakes or
rivers navigable in 1900, which do predict population in that year, but instrumental variables
regressions show little change relative to the ordinary least squares regressions. As such, we find
62
little evidence to support the view that greater capital in cities explains much.12 Equations (2.5)
and (2.6) leave us with two alternative views about the connection between productivity and
area size. In principle, the equations suggest that either higher prices or standard agglomeration
effects, coming from reductions in transport costs, could explain the productivity-area size link.
We believe that these two views can be taken together, since in many cases, higher prices are
directly reflecting agglomeration economies. For example in Krugman (1991), concentrated firms
are able to get more for their goods because other firms are located in the same area. Prices
will actually be lower in the core as well, because transport costs are saved, and lower costs of
intermediate goods can also increase productivity.
There is a long and distinguished literature on agglomeration economies, and there is little
doubt that many forms of such economies exist. Such traditional agglomeration effects are
compatible with the absence of agglomeration economies in low human capital cities only if there
is some reason why the industries in those cities do not benefit from proximity, while industries in
high-human capital cities do. Yet controlling for the industrial characteristics of the metropolitan
area, and for interactions between these variables and area population, has little impact on the
robust interaction between population and skill levels. It is not clear if all of these theories can
explain the interaction between city size and human capital, but at least some of them can. For
example, if agglomeration economies came from the reduction of transaction costs in business
services, and if those costs took the form of lost time, then the value of reducing these time costs
would be higher in place with higher levels of human capital. If these standard agglomeration
economies explain the city size-productivity link, then hopefully future work will help us to
understand why these effects are stronger in more educated places.
2.4 The Link Between Human Capital And Agglomeration Economies
While standard agglomeration theories do not automatically predict the interaction between
urban size and area education, theories that emphasize the spread of knowledge in urban areas
12These estimates primarily focus on private capital. Many forms of public capital, such as roads, are
disproportionately present in less dense areas (Duranton and Turner, 2012), so we suspect that controlling for
public capital would do little to explain the connection between density and productivity.
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do. If cities facilitate the spread of information, then this advantage will be more important
when the people living in those cities have higher levels of human capital. This suggests that
there are two, in some senses quite similar, hypotheses that can explain the overall connection
between productivity and agglomeration and why the agglomeration effects are so much stronger
in skilled places. One view is that workers acquire more skills in big, skilled areas (Glaeser,
1999; Peri, 2002). The second view is that the Solow residual is higher in such places because of
the speedy spread of ideas. According to the first of these theories, the workers on Wall Street
benefit from the ability to learn more quickly from each other. According to the second view,
their firms’ leaders are better able to acquire ideas in these areas.
While this latter hypothesis has been taken seriously since Lucas (1988), we know of little
direct evidence testing this view.13 There has been more work on the connection between worker
human capital accumulation and urban density. The two views differ in their predictions about
the age-earnings profile in cities. The worker-learning hypothesis suggests that age-earnings
profiles should be steeper in skilled, dense areas where workers learn from each other. The
innovation hypothesis can mean that skills depreciate more quickly in such places, which would
make the age-earnings profile flatter. We test to distinguish these two hypotheses here.
2.4.1 Evidence on Worker Learning in Cities
Glaeser and Mare (2001) examine the urban wage premium in models with worker-fixed effects.
They find that only a modest fraction of the urban wage premium is earned by workers when they
come to urban areas. Similarly, the urban wage premium is not lost by workers when they leave
big cities. Instead, workers who came to cities experience somewhat faster wage growth. This
evidence seems to point against a generalized urban-productivity effect toward a wage-growth
effect, which could be interpreted as faster learning in cities. This wage growth may also be
associated with easier job hopping in cities, where workers increase wages and productivity as
they move from firm to firm (Freedman, 2008). The connection between wage gains and job
mobility may reflect better matching in cities, or the gradual accumulation of human capital
13Relatively little work has been done using microdata to assess whether firm productivity rises with time in a
dense, or well-educated city. Breau and Rigby (2008) look at such a learning model, but focus on learning through
exporting.
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that is acquired when individuals work for different employers.
Since human capital accumulation is typically inferred by looking at age-earnings profiles,
it is particularly natural to test the hypothesis that cities increase the rate of human capital
accumulation by looking at whether wage growth is faster over the life-cycle in metropolitan
areas. Table 2.3 shows the basic pattern of wage growth in urban areas. The dependent variable
is the log of hourly wage, and data come from the 2000 Census. The first column shows the basic
pattern of wage growth over the life-cycle for males between the ages of 25 and 65 (to avoid
retirement issues and working part time). Experience is defined as age minus years of education
minus six.
The first column shows that the majority of earnings growth occurs over the first 15 years.
Relative to workers with between 0 and 5 years of experience, workers with between 6 and 10
years of experience earn 0.194 log points higher wages and workers with between 11 and 15 years
of experience gain 0.335 log points in wages. Wage growth continues, albeit at a slower clip,
throughout ones life.
In the second column, we show the interactions of years of the independent variables with
residing in a metropolitan area. We do not report the overall experience coefficients to save
space, though they remain similar to those shown in the first column. The coefficients in the
second column reflect the extra gains in wages that seem to accrue to metropolitan workers at
each experience level. Metropolitan area workers earn a level effect of 0.036 log points more than
nonmetro workers at the start of their careers. This gap rises an additional 0.028 log points for
workers with between 6 and 10 years of experience.Workers with between 11 and 15 years of
experience earn 0.06 log points on top of the level effect, meaning a total premium of 0.096 log
points. The coefficients then level off.
These results that replicate those found in Glaeser and Mare (2001) for the 2000 Census,
suggest that human capital accumulation is faster in metropolitan areas. The metropolitan area
wage effect for inexperienced workers is about one-third its value for more experienced workers.
This finding hints at the possibility that much of the effect of cities comes over time, as workers
either acquire skills more quickly, or perhaps match more efficiently in large places.
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While there is a significant interaction between metropolitan area status and experience,
there is no clear link between metropolitan area population and log of experience. In column
5 of Table 2.1, we report the absence of such a connection. Workers in a metropolitan area
face a steeper age-earnings profile, but the wage profile does not become particularly steep in
larger metropolitan areas. In regression 6 of Table 2.1, we show that being in a skilled area does
steepen the age-earnings profile, which is compatible with the view that people are learning
more in skilled areas. Regression 7 shows that there is no interaction between metropolitan area
population and share with college degrees, which perhaps is unsurprising because there was no
experience effect of metropolitan area population.
Returning to Table 2.3, where there is a basic metropolitan area effect, we now look to see
whether there is an interaction between that effect and the skill level of the metropolitan area.
Column 3 shows the comparison between those in the 100 most skilled MSAs and those living
outside metropolitan areas. Working in these areas provides a large-level effect of 0.069 log
points to workers immediately upon starting employment. The experience profile is steeper in
these skilled cities than in the full sample shown in column 2. Workers with 6 to 10 years of
experience earn an additional 0.035 log point premium, and this rises to 0.075 for those with 11
to 15 years and 0.093 log points for those with 16 to 20 years. These results mean that experience
is associated with a 0.162 log point premium for workers in skilled metropolitan areas relative to
nonmetropolitan workers.
Column 4 shows that the same does not hold in the 100 least skilled MSAs. Here the level
effect is small and insignificant, and the experience trajectory substantially flatter, showing no
significant difference with the nonmetropolitan workers until the 16 to 20 year group. The wage
growth associated with living in a metro area comes primarily from highly skilled cities. The
F-tests in columns 3 and 4 show that the differences in coefficients are significant at the one
percent level.
As in our results in Table 2.1, the fifth and sixth columns find less support for an interaction
between city size and experience. Column 5 compares those living in the 25 most populated
metropolitan areas to those living in all other metro areas, and finds a significant level effect of
0.081 log points, but no effect on the experience profile. The presence of an interaction between
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city size and city skill would imply that we might see a stronger effect if we limit the sample to
only those in highly skilled cities, but this turns out not to be the case, as Column 6 shows a
similar level effect, and no effect on the experience-earnings path.
The results in Table 2.3 also cast doubt on the view that skilled people are drawn by amenities
to locate in larger or more skilled metropolitan areas. If that hypothesis were correct, then
the presence of skilled people would act as something of a labor supply shock and we should
expect lower earnings for more skilled people in large agglomerations. If amenities were higher in
big cities for skilled workers, then the logic of a spatial equilibrium suggests that wages should
be lower. Yet across all of our specifications, the interactions between skills and metropolitan
locations are positive. As such, it does not seem likely that amenities are causing more skilled
people to locate in large metropolitan areas.
More direct evidence on knowledge fails to provide much support to the learning-in-cities
hypothesis. In Table 2.4, we look at the connection between tests of reasoning and vocabulary
and both being raised in and currently residing in a city. This evidence is from the General
Social Survey (GSS) that subjects adults to tests and has a question about the place in which the
adult was brought up. Using place of childhood residence is presumably slightly more exogenous
than using place of current residence, but we use both.
The first two columns show that while rural children do worse, the highest test scores were
earned by people who were brought up in suburbs. People brought up in big cities do slightly
worse on these tests than people brought up in small towns. In the second two columns, we look
at place of current residence and find little evidence of a connection between city residence and
these skills. While these tests will not capture the most important skills learned working in a
big metropolitan area, the fact that we do not find any significant link is not supportive of the
learning-in-cities hypothesis.
These results are meant primarily to illustrate the type of evidence that could definitively
show that people in cities learn more quickly. So far, no such evidence exists. It is true that
people in cities enjoy faster wage growth, but that wage growth is concentrated in more skilled
areas. There is no direct evidence linking measurable skill accumulation to urban residence.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number Correct 
on Vocab Test
Number Correct on 
Reasoning Test
Number Correct 
on Vocab Test
Number Correct on 
Reasoning Test
Residence at Age 16:
Rural, Non-Farm -0.2605 -0.323
[0.0463]** [0.1278]*
Rural, Farm -0.4229 -0.2659
[0.0414]** [0.1168]*
Small Town
(under 50,000)
Small City 0.0235 -0.1101
(50,000 - 250,000) [0.0419] [0.1046]
Suburb of Large City 0.2833 0.081
[0.0458]** [0.1084]
Large City (250,000+) -0.0748 -0.2612
[0.0433] [0.1164]*
Current Residence:
Rural -0.1079 0.002
[0.0481]* [0.1519]
Small Town
(under 50,000)
Suburb of Small City 0.112 0.1772
[0.0464]* [0.1311]
Small City -0.1336 0.3092
(50,000 - 250,000) [0.0509]** [0.1355]*
Suburb of Large City 0.1964 0.0114
[0.0443]** [0.1247]
Large City (250,000+) -0.094 0.1467
[0.0497] [0.1392]
Years of Schooling 0.3485 0.1962 0.3591 0.2029
[0.0049]** [0.0128]** [0.0048]** [0.0128]**
Age 0.0541 0.024 0.0498 0.0233
[0.0045]** [0.0132] [0.0045]** [0.0133]
Age Squared -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
Observations [0.0000]** [0.0001]* [0.0000]** [0.0001]*
Male Dummy -0.1906 0.0229 -0.2065 0.0173
[0.0269]** [0.0707] [0.0269]** [0.0707]
Observations 22929 2182 22970 2185
R-Squared 0.27 0.15 0.27 0.14
(omitted)
Table 2.4: Vocabulary and Reasoning by Places of Residence
Notes: Data presented come from the General Social Survey. See the Data Appendix for more details. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
(omitted) (omitted)
(omitted)
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we document that agglomeration effects are much stronger for cities with more
skills. This finding points to agglomeration theories that emphasize knowledge accumulation in
big cities, rather than theories that emphasize natural advantage or gains from speedy movement
of basic commodities. Yet, there is little direct evidence on the knowledge-based agglomeration
economies. Empirical researchers have not managed as of yet, to sort out how these agglomeration
economies work.
Glaeser and Mare (2001) put forward some evidence suggesting that skill accumulation works
faster in metropolitan areas. We duplicate that evidence here, and find that these learning
effects are strongest in more skilled metropolitan areas. While these results suggest a strong
complementarity between skills, city size, and learning, other direct tests of that complementarity
find little evidence. At present we are left with tantalizing hints, but little that is conclusive.
One speculative interpretation of the results is that two things are simultaneously happening
in skilled, big cities. First, workers are indeed learning from one another more quickly. Second,
the rate of technological change is faster. Together, both effects create the interaction between
city size and population across skilled metropolitan areas. The results on age-earnings profiles
would be ambiguous if both effects were present, because sometimes the learning effect (which
steepens the profile) dominates and sometimes the technological change effect (which flattens the
profile) dominates. We hope that further research will sort out these interpretations.
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Chapter 3
Regionalism Versus Fragmentation:
An Assessment of the Impact of the
Structure of Local Governance from
1970 to 2010
3.1 Introduction
Are local governments prepared to face the challenges of the 21st century? An increasingly loud
chorus of researchers and politicians argue that they are not.1 Local governments, in their view,
are too fractionalized to continue to maintain and provide the necessary infrastructure for a
population increasingly concentrated in large metro areas. They lack sufficient coordination
to make key regional planning decisions, and instead battle with each other to exclude new
development, relegating building to the urban fringe, pushing up rents and limiting population
growth. They encourage the formation of homogeneous enclaves with little racial or economic
diversity, segregating minority and low income residents in less desirable portions of the city.
Regional governance, in this view, is the way of the future if only sufficiently powerful coalitions
1For a sampling of such voices, see the essays compiled by Bruce ? in the collection ”Reflections on Regionalism.”
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can be formed to make it happen.
In large swaths of the country, particularly in the South and West, regionalism is already
present, and has been for some time. Metro areas in Arizona and New Mexico average just one
municipal or town government for every 1600 square miles of land area, compared to one for
every 16 square miles in Pennsylvania and New Jersey metro areas, and the number of such
governments has remained almost constant over at least a 50 year period. This considerable cross-
MSA variation provides an opportunity to examine the impacts of government fragmentation over
the past several decades to better understand the role that it plays in shaping urban outcomes.
Is pessimism about the impacts of urban fractionalization warranted, or, as been argued by some
economists dating back to Charles Tiebout, does a plethora of smaller jurisdictions encourage
competition and more efficient provision of public goods by local governments?
Disentangling the answers to these questions in the data is made difficult by the high degree
of correlation between the level of fractionalization and other historical urban attributes. Areas
with highly fractionalized governments tend to be places near the east coast or the Great Lakes,
where settlement occurred early and manufacturing was thriving for much of the 20th century.
By contrast, regionalized government is more common in Sun Belt locations that entered the
latter half of the century with sparser populations and warm winter temperatures that proved
attractive once air conditioning lessened the disamenity of hot summers.
While part of the optimism of regionalists comes from the rapid expansion of these areas, the
positive impacts of regionalism on population and income growth are mostly washed away by a
relatively small set of controls that takes account of these differences in starting position. While
pinning down precise zeros is tough, especially with such strong correlation between variables,
the results presented here do nothing to strengthen the argument for regionalism’s impact on
population and income growth, though they suggest little downside either.
Where impacts are more apparent are on variables more closely tied to the sorting of different
types of people across and within metro areas. The share of educated workers seems to be
growing more quickly in places with highly fractionalized governments, even when controlling for
a host of regional confounders. While there is some evidence that people born in these places are
more likely to become college graduates, perhaps lending support to the role of Tiebout sorting
72
in education production, the preference of mobile educated adults for living in these areas is
more likely a reflection of amenities in production or consumption that are particularly appealing
to the more educated, rather than a desire to stay in place after completing schooling.
The strongest downside to fragmentation that comes through clearly in the data is the
strong positive impact on segregation. Even as segregation of blacks and non-blacks has fallen
sharply across the entire country, fractionalized places have lagged slightly behind their more
regionalized peers in realizing this decline. What in 1970 was a modest relationship between
fractionalization and segregation that disappeared upon conditioning on the size of the black
and overall populations, has grown to be a robust difference by 2010. Despite this, fractionalized
locations have not lost their appeal to black residents; if anything their black populations have
grown more quickly. Finally I examine the impact of fragmentation on sprawl and find mixed
evidence. In neither levels nor changes is there much difference in the residential density gradient
between fractionalized and regionalized areas in 1970 and 2010. However, employment does
appear to be less centralized in fragmented metro in areas in the 2010 cross-section. Unfortunately
the time series for employment location does not stretch back far enough to allow for a meaningful
comparison across time, so whether this is a result of initial conditions or subsequent sprawl
remains unclear.
Following this introduction I chart the historical evolution of local government fragmentation
and look at its correlates in early data. I then consider in more depth Tiebout’s theory of
the benefits of competition and under what conditions regional cooperation would be more
advantageous. The bulk of the paper is devoted to examining these hypotheses using data from
1970 through 2010 on urban growth, education levels, segregation and sprawl.
3.2 The Origins of Local Government Fragmentation
Figure 3.1 shows the nearly perfect correlation between the log of the number of municipal and
town governments per 100 square miles in US metro areas from the 1962 Census of Governments
and the same variable from 2007.
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Figure 3.1: Local Governments in 1962 and 2007
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Figure 3.2: School Districts in 1962 and 2007
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The correlation coefficient is 0.978 and the coefficient from a regression is very close to one;
with few exceptions the number of local governments has remained unchanged for nearly a half
century. Stability, however, has not always been the case when it comes to local governance.
While counts of governments for all metro areas are not available for prior years, historical
accounts suggest a very different pattern in earlier time periods.
The Boston area provides one example. While Massachusetts, and New England more
broadly, have long prided themselves on participatory local governance centered on small town
meetings, this tradition did little to slow the aggressive annexation of surrounding towns by
Boston throughout the latter part of the 19th century. Boston annexed the town of Roxbury in
1868, followed by Dorchester in 1870, and Charlestown, Brighton and West Roxbury in 1874,
though it was famously rebuked by Brookline voters in a referendum the preceding year. The
city would resume expansion in 1912 with the annexation of Hyde Park, but has not added land
area since.
Boston’s history in this regard is not atypical. While New York’s consolidation of surrounding
towns into a five-borough metropolis is the most famous example of surrounding cities being
absorbed into a central government, cities throughout the densely settled portion of the country
routinely expanded their geographic scope by annexation and consolidation throughout the
latter part of the 19th century. In fact, Brookline’s rejection of Boston’s overture was the first
notable example of a wealthy suburban enclave resisting the push for consolidation with a larger
central city, an example soon to have many followers as suburbs grew in the wake of continuing
transportation advances around the turn of the century (Jackson, 1985). By the early to mid 20th
century few suburbs saw any advantage to merging with central cities that contained larger poor,
minority and immigrant populations, and the current map of municipal and town governance
was more or less fixed.
That is not to say there has been no change in the boundaries of local governments over the
past century, but rather that the flux has been concentrated in places with large unincorporated
areas, and amongst school districts and special districts that often bridge town boundaries, or
carve out space within them. Cities whose populations have expanded more recently in the
South and West have often found it easy to add land area as their development has expanded
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into outlying unincorporated areas. This freedom is not available in the Northeast and much
of the Midwest where nearly all land is already incorporated (Rusk, 2003). In these regions,
the slowdown in consolidations and annexations was followed by the proliferation of many
small independent school districts that did not always align with town boundaries, as well as
a host of special districts for water, sewerage, fire and later on, housing and urban renewal.
These more ad hoc forms of government likely reduced the demand for subsequent waves of
governmental consolidation, allowing regional functions to be performed without fully regionalizing
the government, but nonetheless left most local decision-making power in the hands of municipal
and town governments.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the changes between 1962 and 2007 in the number of school districts
and special districts. The correlation over time is strong, 0.86 for school districts and 0.76 for
special districts, though not as perfect as that seen for metropolitan and town governments.
Furthermore, the aggregate changes are striking - the number of independent school districts was
cut in half over the time period, while the number of special districts doubled. In light of the
more transitory nature of these forms of governance, I will be focusing on the more permanent
town and municipal governments as my main variable of interest in the results for the paper,
examining the impact of the 1962 level on subsequent changes in urban outcomes. Reassuringly,
the three forms of governance are highly correlated, for instance, Figure 3.4 shows the correlation
of 0.62 between the number of school districts in 1962 and the number of town and municipal
governments in the same year.
Before turning to an examination of the consequences of government fragmentation, I look
first at the historical correlates of local government density. Given the way that government
consolidations played out over time, we might expect to see strong correlations between the
density of local governments in an area and variables that correlate with the time of settlement
of that area. Table 3.1 confirms that indeed, many variables such as year of statehood, area
temperature, historical population and concentration of manufacturing have strong correlations
with the log of the number of local governments per 100 miles. Figures 3.5 through 3.12 present
these correlations visually.
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Figure 3.3: Special Districts in 1962 and 2007
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Figure 3.4: Local Governments and School Districts, 1962
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Figure 3.5: Fragmentation and Year of Statehood
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Figure 3.6: Fragmentation and January Temperature
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Figure 3.5 depicts the correlation of -0.43 between log government density and the year of
statehood for the MSA’s primary city. The 37 MSAs in the 13 original colonies average just over
3 local governments per 100 square miles, whereas that number is around 0.5 in the 17 MSAs in
states that entered the Union in 1890 or later.2 Figure 3.6 shows the similarly strong negative
correlation of -0.56 between log local government density and the mean January temperature,
where colder regions like the Northeast and Upper Midwest stand out for having both low winter
temperatures and high levels of government fractionalization.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 turn to historical population correlations. In looking at the impacts of
government fractionalization throughout the paper I focus on changes over the period from 1970
to 2010, so it is worth benchmarking the relationship at the outset of this period. Figure 3.7
shows the 0.31 correlation between the log population in 1970 and log government density in
1962. Given that the local government map had been relatively fixed for some time even prior
to 1962, I also compare how population in an earlier era relates to government density. Figure
10 examines the correlation of 1962 fractionalization with 1900 population levels. The earlier
variable is actually a stronger correlate of government fractionalization, as the more recently
settled, and hence more regionalized areas of the country experienced considerable catch-up
growth during the early and middle parts of the twentieth century.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 repeat the 1970 and 1900 comparisons, but this time for the share of
the workforce employed in the manufacturing sector. Areas now referred to as the Rust Belt,
such as Western Pennsylvania and cities surrounding the Great Lakes, had a large percentage of
their employment concentrated in manufacturing both at the turn of the century and through
to 1970, after which they were the hardest hit by the national decline in manufacturing. These
areas tended to be convenient to ports and navigable rivers, and saw early settlement and growth
compared to other regions of the country. Their levels of government fragmentation reflect this
early settlement, and it will be important to account for the decline of manufacturing when
teasing out the impacts of fractionalization on late 20th century outcomes.
2Alaska and Hawaii are omitted from the entire analysis due in part to their unique geographic character, as
well as the lack of defined counties in early data in Alaska that makes maintaining consistent metro area boundaries
impossible. The Anchorage MSA is in fact an example of a highly regionalized government, as its huge land area
is governed centrally as a single unit. Given the differences between Alaska and the continental US it is unclear
whether lessons from its experience could be expected to translate.
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Figure 3.7: Fragmentation and Population in 1970
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Figure 3.8: Fragmentation and Population in 1900
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Figure 3.9: Fragmentation and Manufacturing in 1970
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Figure 3.10: Fragmentation and Manufacturing in 1900
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Figure 3.11: Fragmentation and BA Share in 1970
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Figure 3.12: Fragmentation and Family Income in 1970
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Finally, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 present the relatively modest -0.16 correlation between the
percentage of adults holding bachelor’s degrees in 1970 and log government density, and the
stronger 0.41 correlation between log mean family income and log government density. Though
areas with higher levels of fractionalization had lower levels of education, their nominal income
levels were higher, likely reflecting the strong presence of manufacturing shown in the previous
figures. As manufacturing has declined, urban fortunes have become more closely tied to area
education levels, so the interplay between these variables merits attention in my examination of
changes during the subsequent time period.
3.3 Hypotheses
In theory the impact of government fractionalization on metropolitan outcomes such as popula-
tion and income growth is ambiguous. Proponents of a fractionalized system of metropolitan
governance, starting with Tiebout (1956) argue that competition by a small jurisdictions fighting
for residents will lead local governments to provide public goods more efficiently, thus advantaging
the area as a whole in comparison to those with more regional governance. On the other hand, if
there are returns to scale or externalities in the provision of the public goods, then larger regional
governments might be better at coordinating resources to best serve their constituents. I outline
the main arguments for each side here before turning to an evaluation of empirical evidence over
the last forty years.
Tiebout’s seminal paper posited that under the proper conditions, footloose residents voting
with their feet between a sufficiently large number of jurisdictions could be expected to reach an
equilibrium with efficient provision of public goods. This stood in contrast to the more pessimistic
traditional analysis of public goods (e.g. Samuelson (1954)) which argued that a decentralized
solution to the public goods problem was impossible. In Tiebout’s argument, residents would
express their willingness to pay for collective amenities by bidding up housing prices in areas that
provided the public goods they desired. With the housing market thus serving as a revelation
mechanism for amenity demand, communities could set taxes and amenity levels such that in
equilibrium the marginal benefit of the amenities provided to the residents choosing to live in
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each community would precisely equal the marginal cost of providing those amenities.
Were Tiebout correct, and were the conditions he assumed to hold, then we might expect
metropolitan areas with a greater number of local governments to grow at faster rates than those
lacking intergovernmental competition, given their ability to more efficiently allocate public goods.
This conclusion depends on the assumptions made about the mobility within and between metro
areas. For instance, if movement across metro areas is assumed to be as costless as movement
within, then regionally governed metro areas would be expected to behave like the smaller
communities Tiebout describes, and there are no clear implications for growth. In fact, Tiebout
envisions each of his communities having a U-shaped cost curve for public goods, implying an
optimal size for each community that should be static in equilibrium.
Tiebout’s optimistic conclusion turns out to be quite sensitive to his precise set of explicit and
implicit assumptions. The subsequent theoretical literature found that an efficient equilibrium
failed to exist for a variety of realistic interpretations of the local public goods problem. This
culminated with Bewley (1981)’s paper in which he presented a set of counterexamples to argue
that the only case in which a Tiebout equilibrium exists is the case where profit-maximizing
governments produce public goods whose cost varies proportionally with population, where the
number of governments exceeds the number of types of consumers, where utility does not depend
on location, and where communities do not differ in resources or production functions. This
restrictive case is unlikely to apply to most realistic problems of public good allocation.
While Tiebout’s precise theoretical model may be inapplicable in most interesting cases,
his insight that interjurisdictional competition could yield advantages in public good provision
remains a compelling hypothesis and one that has garnered interest in the modern empirical
literature (e.g. Hoxby (2000).) Finding a role for regionalism requires investigating the places
where Tiebout’s logic is most likely to break down. I explore several strands here.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for regionalism, and one Tiebout realized and explicitly
assumed away, is that the economies of scale and external benefits of public goods may not
fit tightly within the borders of small communities. The question of fractionalization versus
regionalism comes down to whether the goods and services local governments provide tend to
look like those Tiebout assumed. Local governments spent 1.66 trillion dollars in 2011, with
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education (600 billion), utilities such as water, gas, electric, sewer and waste management (210
billion), police and fire protection (126 billion), highways and transit (108 billion) and hospital
(86 billion) making up the largest components of those expenditures.
Certainly some of these goods have benefits that extend across jurisdictional lines. Money
spent on infrastructure for roads and utilities that extend across communities has benefits that
are not neatly contained by jurisdictional borders. To the extent that user fees provide much
of the financing for these categories of expenditure, matching the costs with the benefits of
these services may be achievable at any level of government. Police and fire protection tend to
be more localized, though fire departments do aid in the response to large fires in neighboring
jurisdictions, and crime may either spillover or sort across borders, leading to interdependence
between the levels of police protection across communities.
Given that education is the largest local expenditure it has drawn considerable attention in
the literature. In their work on the growth of education over the 20th century, Goldin (2001),
and Goldin and Katz (2008) point to the flexibility provided by small jurisdictions in explaining
the early proliferation of secondary education in the United States. This flexibility came not only
from the more localized governance of America compared to its European counterparts, but also
the ease with which new school districts were created independently of existing jurisdictional
boundaries.
Hoxby argues that the impact of Tiebout competition on education is positive in the modern
period as well, using streams to instrument for government fractionalization within metropolitan
areas. Her finding of positive results of competition on test scores has been controversial, and has
been rebutted by Rothstein (2007). The strong correlations between many of the variables in the
previous section suggest that the exclusion restriction for rivers may not hold, but nonetheless,
the argument that Tiebout sorting has a positive impact on education remains a possibility.
The importance of school districts suggests my focus on towns and municipality governments
may miss out on some of the benefits of localization that may occur at the school district level,
though the fractionalization across these levels of government is highly correlated. On the
other hand, Goldin and Katz point out that while Tiebout competition may once have been a
virtue in the spread of public education, it may be a vice in the later era that I study when
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concerns about equal access to education became more prevalent. It may be that fractionalized
jurisdictions adequately provide the private benefit of education to the children that reside within
while underproviding the public component that comes from having a well-educated national
population. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) formalize this notion in a multi-generation model
showing that relative to the Tiebout equilibrium, inducing wealthy individuals to move to poorer
neighborhoods can lead to higher overall provision of education and greater wealth in every
community in the subsequent generations.
This connects with a second argument against government fractionalization which argues
that it leads to segregation. The Tiebout model sees the sorting of people by willingness to
pay for amenities as beneficial in arriving at the proper allocation of public goods. However, if
segregation of people along these lines has direct negative consequences then the rationale for
fractionalization might be considerably undermined. Of particular focus has been the tendency
for such sorting to occur along lines of race and class. Cutler and Glaeser (1999) test the impact
of segregation on black outcomes across metro areas and find significant impacts on education,
employment and single parenthood. However the large-scale experimental intervention in Moving
to Opportunity (Kling et al., 2007) did not find support for the impact of neighborhood on these
outcomes, though it did find impacts on mental health.
Not only might segregation be harmful in its own right, but exclusionary policies designed to
achieve it may incur deadweight loss. Given that in reality the number of jurisdictions is unlikely
to exceed the number of preference types, residents are not assured that those different than
them will happily segregate themselves in their own neighborhood. As a result, communities
often use zoning to exclude those who desire lower levels of housing consumption than incumbent
residents. Such policies may be harmful through their impact on the segregation concerns above,
but also on the overall supply of housing within a given distance of the city center.
Allowing space to play a more meaningful role in the model brings up additional concerns
beyond exclusionary zoning. Tiebout explicitly rules out any relationship between residential
location and employment opportunities, removing any role for the physical form of the city in his
model. Regionalists, on the other hand, are often quite concerned with the impact of government
fractionalization on employment decentralization and residential sprawl. If a primary driver of
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urban sprawl is an eagerness of residents to flee the fiscal obligations of living in a poor central
city jurisdiction, then places with regional government might be expected to sprawl more slowly.
The normative implications of sprawl are not clear (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004) but it is nonetheless
worth investigating whether government fractionalization has an impact on it.
3.4 Results: The Impacts of Government Fractionalization
3.4.1 Density, Income and Rents
In Table 3.2 I examine the impact of government fractionalization on growth in population density
from 1970 to 2010. To benchmark the results, in column 1 I measure the level of convergence
over the period by regressing the log growth in population density over the period on its initial
value in 1970. The coefficient of -0.1939 implies that an MSA twice as dense as another in 1970
would have been expected to grow about 20 percent more slowly over the forty year period.
Column 2 suggests that almost all of this convergence could be explained by including the log
of the density of town and municipal governments in the MSA in 1962. Places with twice as many
local governments would be expected to have grown about 17 percent less over the time period.
Throughout this entire paper I cluster standard errors by state to allow for correlation in the error
terms within a state. This correlation could arise for any number of reasons, but it is particularly
important to account for when some of the variation in the dependent variable is driven by
state-level policy, as is the case with government fractionalization given state incorporation and
annexation laws.
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Recalling the strong historical correlations we saw in section 2 of the paper, we might worry
the effect in column 2 is being driven by other variables correlated with both population growth
and government fractionalization. Columns 3 through 5 explore this possibility. Column 3
controls for the share of the MSA’s employment in the manufacturing sector in the base year of
1970, which is strongly related to a subsequent decline in the MSA’s rate of growth. The share
of the workforce in manufacturing in US metropolitan areas remained near its post-war peak
at just over 25 percent of the workforce in 1970, but had fallen to less than half of that by the
end of the period. The impact of the decline of manufacturing was certainly felt in places with
higher shares - a place with twice the share of its workforce in manufacturing saw its growth
fall by about a third. The inclusion of this variable also cuts the coefficient on local government
fractionalization by about a third, though it remains highly significant.
Another prominent trend over the last 40 years has been the movement of the population
towards places with warmer climates. The widespread adoption of air conditioning has made
enduring warm July temperatures less taxing, allowing people to take advantage of the warmer
January temperatures that often come with them. Including these in the regression along
with the 1970 population density and the density of local governments lowers the coefficient
on fractionalization to an insignificant -.06 log points. In column 5, with controls both for
manufacturing and climate, the impact of local government fractionalization is reduced to zero,
while all other variables enter with the expected sign. Accounting for these other powerful drivers
of population growth over the last 40 years leaves little role for regionalism in explaining urban
growth patterns.
Columns sixth through ten repeat the same regressions while including region fixed effects. All
of the explanatory variables correlate strongly across regions, raising concerns that the regressions
are picking up broad regional trends rather than the impacts of the variables themselves. Of
course those regional trends may themselves be the result of the included variables, but finding
strong intra-regional as well as inter-regional impacts would inspire more confidence about the
variable’s possible impact. Merely controlling for the 4 census regions reduces the coefficient on
government fractionalization by half and renders it insignificant at the 5 percent level. Adding in
the remaining explanatory variables further erodes the coefficient on regional governance, to the
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point where it is insignificantly positive by column 10. Comparing the other coefficients between
columns 5 and 10 confirms that their impacts are fairly robust to region fixed effects, as the
coefficients are little changed other than a doubling of the impact of July temperature. With
both temperature variables included their impacts are somewhat imprecise within region, though
including either one separately (not shown) yields significant positive coefficients.
Table 3.3 breaks these impacts down by decade. Columns one and two repeat exactly the
regressions of the forty year growth in population density from Table 3.2 columns 2 and 10. The
remaining columns run the same pair of regressions for each of the four decades. The sparse
specification of density growth on government fractionalization and the initial density in 1970
presented in the odd columns shows reliably significant negative coefficients on government
fractionalization, though the coefficient is about half the size in the latter two decades compared
to the earlier ones. The saturated specification, adding region fixed effects as well as controls
for initial share in manufacturing and January and July temperature shows reliably small and
insignificant impacts of government fractionalization on density growth.
The decline in places high in manufacturing employment is particularly pronounced in the
early decades, with a place with double the share of employment in manufacturing seeing about a
ten percent fall in decadal growth in population density for both the seventies and eighties. The
negative impacts of early manufacturing persist through the latter two decades as well, though
at about half the size. July temperature is a particularly strong correlate of growth in the latter
two decades.
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Tables 3.4 through 3.6 repeat the same set of decadal regressions for mean household income,
mean rent and mean real income. Following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), growth in income
and rents can used to discern whether areas are changing with respect to amenities useful in
production and consumption. If an area has features that make labor increasingly productive
there then nominal incomes for equivalently skilled workers will rise to attract workers to the
more productive location. At the same time, holding consumption amenities constant, rents
must also rise such that the marginal worker’s real wage remains constant across all locations.
Consumption amenities, in contrast, must lower the real wage, such that the higher real wages
in low amenity areas compensate workers for the cost of foregoing better amenities elsewhere.
This fall in real income is accomplished by bidding up rents in high amenity locations, as well
as expanding the labor force in these areas, moving outwards along the downward sloping local
labor demand curve, and thus lowering nominal wages.
If greater regional cooperation on infrastructure allows areas to increase firm and worker
productivity over time then we would expect the impact of government fractionalization on
nominal incomes to be positive. Higher levels of human capital could also lead to higher incomes,
so if Tiebout sorting leads to higher educational attainment, or vice versa as suggested by
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), that might be reflected in area mean income. I will return to a
more direct examination of educational attainment below.
The forty year regressions for the growth in the log of mean family income in columns one and
two suggest that fractionalization plays only a small role in explaining changes in area incomes.
As was true of population density, a regression of log income growth on government density and
log initial income yields a significant negative coefficient, though even in this sparse specification
the magnitude of the coefficient is small at negative 2.4 log points over a forty year period. In
contrast, convergence in incomes across MSAs has been quite strong over the period at negative
30 log points.
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Adding in the initial manufacturing share, the temperature variables and region fixed effects
switches the sign of the impact of government fractionalization to an insignificant positive. Not
surprisingly, places high in manufacturing in the 1970 saw slower income growth in subsequent
decades. Temperature, while a strong predictor of population growth, seems to have little
impact on income growth, consistent with the view that temperature is more beneficial in
consumption rather than production. The decadal regressions offer nothing to suggest an impact
of fractionalization on income growth at any point in the time period. Among the only coefficients
of note are those on the initial level of household income, showing particularly strong convergence
between 1970 and 1980. This could be interpreted in two ways. Either it could be viewed as
suggesting strong short run mean reversion in area income such that gaps are erased within
10 years, or it might suggest that longer run trends in area income, which have been noted by
authors (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1991) were drawing to a close by around 1980.
Next, I turn to area rents, measured as the mean gross rent (inclusive of utilities) for all
apartments in a metro area. Changes in rent could be driven by changes in production and
consumption amenities, as suggested by the Roback model, though increasingly the literature has
pointed to the importance of housing supply factors such as land use restrictions in explaining
dynamics in the housing market (Glaeser et al., 2005). Augmenting the Roback model with a
housing supply curve that varies between markets means that in markets with few barriers to
construction any growth in productivity or quality of life factors will be reflected in population
growth rather than rental price growth, whereas the opposite will be true in restricted housing
markets.
Land use has become an increasing focus of the regionalism literature, particularly among
those concerned about urban sprawl. If, as has been suggested, competition between jurisdictions
encourages communities to employ exclusionary zoning policies, then government fractionalization
may lead to steeper housing supply curves and greater increases in rents conditional on other
outcomes. Of course piecemeal zoning restrictions are not the only type of land use restriction,
and regional governments are quite capable of themselves limiting construction. Many point
to coordinated regional efforts to preserve green space in places such as Portland, Oregon, and
Silicon Valley, as examples of successful regional planning. While these types of policies may
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be successful in maintaining greenery, their results could lead to reduced housing supply and
increasing prices in the absence of other strategies for expanding supply. Portland, by some
accounts, has avoided these outcomes by requiring increasing density within its urban growth
boundary (see Downs (2002)) but Silicon Valley has seen some of the fastest rising housing prices
in the country.
While attempts to measure zoning stringency are complicated by the wide array of regulations
available to local governments, the Wharton Residential Land Use Survey (Gyourko et al., 2008)
provides several metrics along which jurisdictions can be compared. Aggregating these up to
the metro area level, Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the correlations between two of their measures
and government fractionalization. In Figure 3.13, their composite measure, aggregating factors
like presence of explicit supply and density restrictions, as well as the number of local decision
makers involved in the permitting process, shows almost no relationship with fractionalization
(correlation -0.12). On the right, the average permit delay, a measure of regulatory red tape,
also shows no clear relationship with the density of local governments (correlation -0.04). Any
relationship between land use and regionalism is either too subtle or cross-cutting to show up in
these highly aggregated metrics.
Table 3.5 presents the decadal results of regressions of the growth in log mean rent on log
government density and other correlates of urban growth. Consistent with the lack of clear
relationship between fractionalization and supply restrictiveness, no consistent relationship
between rent growth and government density emerges. The sparse regression in column 1 shows
a significant negative impact of fractionalization on rent growth over the 40 year period, but
adding regional fixed effects and controls for manufacturing share and temperature pushes the
coefficient to zero. Early manufacturing seems to predict rent declines while January temperature
predicts rent increases, consistent with the first being a negative shock to productivity and the
latter being an increasingly valued consumption amenity.
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Figure 3.13: Wharton Land Use Index and Fragmentation
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Figure 3.14: Average Permit Delay and Fragmentation
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Table 3.6 completes the analysis of the implications of the Roback model by investigating
differences in real income. Following Moretti (2013), I calculate area price level as a weighted
average of the national price level and the local rent in a given year, with the weight on local
rent determined by a regression of variation of the local CPI on local rent levels for areas where
a local CPI is calculated. This allows for the fact that prices of locally consumed goods other
than housing will reflect the higher rents that local merchants face. In practice about a third of
the non-housing consumption bundle varies systematically with housing prices, and adding that
to the 42 percent of income spent on housing directly yields a weight of 0.62 on local rents and
0.38 on a common price level.
Subtracting the log of the price level from the log of mean nominal income yields the log of
mean real income for each metro area. Not surprisingly, given the lack of strong relationships
in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the impact of local government density on real income is weak. In
the sparse regression for the forty year period it is a weak but significantly positive 1.6 log
points, and this falls to an insignificant 1 log point in the more saturated specification. The
coefficients on government density across decades, though occasionally significant, are never
large in magnitude. The coefficients on the remaining variables take the expected sign, with
manufacturing, presumably related only to production, having little impact whereas a high
January temperature has been associated with decreasing real incomes. Perhaps surprisingly,
the disamenity value of warm summers appears to be growing over the last decades, as the real
income has grown sharply in places with high July temperatures since 1990.
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Taken as a whole, the results for growth in population, income and rent show little reason to
believe that regionalism has had a strong impact on these core measures of urban performance
over the past four decades. This conclusion comes with a fair number of caveats. The high
level of correlation between government fractionalization and other urban factors renders any
conclusion tentative. Ideally we might have randomly assigned governance structures, or at the
very least been blessed with a greater level of intra-regional variation than is present. Given that
some areas, such as Southwest are almost entirely highly regionalized whereas the Northeast
is almost entirely highly fractionalized, controlling for region effects could be eliminating some
variation that is actually being driven by government fractionalization. The lack of a relationship
within the narrower bands of variation available within regions, or among places with historically
similar industrial compositions, casts doubt on this hypothesis, but it certainly does not rule it
out.
It can also be argued that the number of town and municipal governments may be too crude a
metric of regionalism, and that the impact of regional governance is attenuated by measurement
error compared to a purer measure of the concept. Certainly the number of state and local
governments in 1962 gives far from a complete picture of the variety of forms that local and
regional governance can take. In the backdrop of these more stable forms of local government are
a more volatile set of school districts and special districts that have grown and contracted more
rapidly in some places than others. Moreover, given the limits on annexation and merging present
in state laws, most advocates of regionalism push not for the unification of local governments
but for cooperation between them in the form of pacts or extra-governmental authorities such as
the Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities or the Portland Metro in Portland, Oregon. While
merely counting the number of local governments per square mile ignores these subtleties, it
also would seem to capture the most binding and permanent distinctions in the level of regional
governance across places. If a particular type of regional cooperation were shown to have a strong
impact on the outcomes studied, the results here suggest that we should be cautious in seeing
that as a triumph of regionalism at large, rather than a vindication of one particular regional
policy.
101
3.4.2 Educational Attainment, Segregation and Sprawl
Having found little evidence in support of a strong influence of government fragmentation on
broad urban outcomes like population and income growth, I now turn to three topics that have
gained particular focus in the literature on fractionalization and regionalism. First, I examine
the relationship between local government density and the adult population’s education level. I
then turn to topics of segregation and sprawl.
The impact of fractionalization on educational attainment has been hotly contested (see
Hoxby (2000) and Rothstein (2007).) Even if government fractionalization were to have an
impact on educational attainment of children and college students, what that implies about
cross metro area differences in the education level of the adult population is less clear. Given a
national labor market, there need not be a connection between an area’s production of educated
workers and its subsequent ability to retain them, and some empirical evidence confirms that this
connection is at best tenuous (Bound et al., 2004). The education level of the adult population is
more likely to reflect area skill demands and the differential appeal of certain types of amenities
to workers of different education levels (see Diamond (2012), for a recent exploration of these
issues.) Has government fractionalization had an impact on these variables in the recent period?
Table 3.7 suggests an affirmative answer to this question. Column 1 shows the 40 year growth
in the log of the percent of the population 25 and over with a bachelor’s degree regressed on the
log of local government density and the percent of adults with bachelor’s degree in 1970. The
coefficient on government fractionalization implies that a doubling of the local government density
would have led to a 5 percent increase in the BA share of the adult population, and this result is
highly significant. Adding in controls for the initial manufacturing share and climate variables as
well as regional fixed effects reduces the coefficient to 2.8 log point, but it remains significant
at the 5 percent level. Given that doubling the government density is roughly a one standard
deviation movement when the variable is at its mean level, a resulting 2.8 percent increase in the
BA share is small but still meaningful. This impact seems to be heavily concentrated in the two
earlier decades rather than the more recent period.
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Table 3.8 shows a similar impact of government fractionalization on BA attainment amongst
those born in an area. While data on the metro area of birth is not available, state of birth
is available from the census IPUMS data. States with twice the level of local government
fractionalization, as measured by local governments per square mile, saw the share of adults born
there with bachelor’s degrees increase by between 6 percent more than would have otherwise
been expected from 1970 to 2010, and this result is robust to the inclusion of regional fixed
effects. Again the earlier decades seem to show the strongest results.
This suggests that one possibility for the results in Table 3.7 is that Tiebout sorting did
indeed drive improvements in the local provision of education, and that at least some of these
educated workers chose to stick in their home state regardless of other opportunities. Again,
given the level of mobility across MSAs, particularly among the college educated, it is hard to
imagine that stasis is the primary driver. More likely, producing a highly educated population
is related to either production or consumption amenities attractive to educated workers. One
possibility could be that highly educated workers are drawn to more fractionalized MSAs because
they provide a greater number of small, relatively aﬄuent suburbs with high performing schools.
While the literature on Tiebout sorting views homogeneous suburbs as having a strong appeal to
the aﬄuent within metro areas, little attention has been devoted to the impact of their appeal
on cross-MSA mobility.
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Turning to the impacts of fractionalization on segregation within metro areas, in Table 3.9 I
compare the impact of local government density on the segregation of the black population in
1970 and 2010. The finding that the number of local governments in an area is a strong predictor
of black segregation has been found before (Cutler and Glaeser, 1999), and the result is confirmed
here for both time periods with and without regional fixed effects. To measure segregation I
use the dissimilarity index, which is defined over two races and asks what percentage of one
race would have to move in order for all neighborhoods to have a share of that race equal to the
MSA share. I use black and non-black as the two racial categories, and define neighborhoods
as census tracts, consistently defined over the period from 1970 to 2010 using the Longitudinal
Tract Database. Census tracts covered only metro areas in the 1970 and 1980 censuses, so areas
that have only recently become part of metro areas are not included in the data, limiting my
sample to 221 areas.
Interestingly, in 1970 the effect goes away upon controlling for the black share of the population
and the overall size of the population. While the measure is not mechanically related to the size
of the black population, the data indicate a tendency of larger black populations to be more
segregated. Similarly, while the measure is scale invariant, larger areas also tend to be more
heavily segregated. Though these variables remain robust predictors of segregation in 2010,
the impact of government fractionalization is now robust to their inclusion, with a doubling of
local government density implying a 5 percent increase in the dissimilarity index of an otherwise
similar MSA.
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Table 3.10 confirms the growth of segregation over time, looking at the entire period in
columns 1 and 2 and then showing the results for each decade. Controlling only for the initial
level of segregation, the impact of government fragmentation on the growth in log dissimilarity
is 9 log points, falling to 5 log points when controlling for the total population and the black
share of the population in 1970, as well as adding region fixed effects. Subsequent columns
show that this effect is particularly concentrated in the first two decades. In fact, the growth
in segregation in the most recent period with all controls is a weak and insignificant negative
value. Throughout the regressions I control for the size of the population and black share in
the base year (so 1980 for the regression examining growth from 1980 to 1990) as the variables
seem to have a direct impact on the contemporaneous level of segregation. Meanwhile, I control
only for the 1970 level of segregation so as to measure long run convergence over the entire time
period. Interestingly the negative coefficient on 1970 dissimilarity is strong throughout all four
decades, though declining somewhat from 18 log points in the earliest decade to 11 log points
in the most recent one. Thus, initially highly segregated areas have had particularly strong
declines in segregation throughout the period, even on top of the large declines seen in all areas.
Fractionalization has been pushing against the wind, albeit at a magnitude that has done little
to diminish the declines across all areas.
Despite the fact that segregation is falling more slowly in highly fragmented areas, the black
populations in these areas are if anything growing more quickly. Column 1 in Table 3.11 shows a
regression of the growth of the log of the black share of the population on local government density
and the black share in 1970. The impact of fractionalization is 14 log points and significant at the
1 percent level. This falls to just under 10 log points when adding controls for the manufacturing
share, temperature variables and regional fixed effects, though this coefficient is not significant
at the 5 percent level. The growth of the black share is consistently between 3 and 4 log points
across the specifications with few controls, but is small and insignificant after the initial decade
when more controls are added. While segregation may have negative impacts on black outcomes,
as suggested by Cutler and Glaeser, higher levels of segregation in fractionalized areas does not
seem to be driving away black residents.
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Finally I turn to the implications of fractionalization for urban sprawl. Advocates of
regionalism often express concern about decentralization and the tendency of recent development
to be on the fringes of urban areas, and suggest that regional governance can be a tool for shaping
an MSA’s footprint. While the normative implications of sprawl are beyond the scope of this
paper, I can nonetheless examine whether government fractionalization has impacted the density
of urban development over the past 40 years.
Defining metrics for sprawl has been a challenge for the literature (see Galster et al. (2001)
for discussion of several alternatives) but following Glaeser and Kahn (2004) I will use density
gradients for residence and employment, estimated as the coefficient returned from running a
regression of log density on distance from the central business district. For central business
district location I follow Holian and Kahn (2012) in using the point returned by Google Maps
when performing a search for the primary city of an MSA. As I am using centroids of census
tracts to determine location, I limit myself to the 93 MSAs with over 500,000 residents in 2010
to improve precision in the density regressions. Census tract residence again comes from the
Longitudinal Tract Database, and employment comes from the Zip Code Business patterns
matched to census tracts using the HUD zip code to census tract crosswalk. Unfortunately the
Zip Code Business patterns have only been available since 1994 and the HUD crosswalks began
only quite recently, so I forego a time series and merely examine the 2010 cross-section. For
residential density I am able to look across the entire 40 year period.
Table 3.12 presents the cross-sectional relationships for 1970 and 2010 residential density and
for 2010 employment density. A more negative value of the density gradient implies a greater
level of centralization, as density is sloping down more quickly moving away from the city center.
Columns one and two show the impact of government fractionalization on residential density
in 1970 with and without region fixed effects. The coefficient is positive, implying that more
fractionalized MSAs are more sprawled, and this impact is stronger when regional fixed effects
are included. Adding controls for manufacturing share and temperature variables reduces the
coefficient somewhat and renders it insignificant. Turning to 2010 in columns 4 through 6, similar
patterns emerge, though the coefficients are generally smaller. The coefficients on employment
density in column 7 through 9 are stronger and the impact of government fractionalization
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is significant across specifications. In the full specification in column 9, a doubling of local
government density leads to a 4.34 percent larger (less negative) employment density, suggesting
less clustering of economic activity in the city center.
The changes over time in the impact of government fractionalization on sprawl are small and
generally insignificant, as shown in Table 3.13. This would seem to suggest that fractionalization
has had little impact on the growth in residential sprawl over the last 40 years. Being able to
look at the time series for employment would be interesting, as the 2010 cross-section suggests a
potential role for fractionalization in employment decentralization, but drawing conclusions from
that single data point is difficult.
Other measures of sprawl may well show differing impacts, though Burchfield et al. (2006)
reach a similar conclusion when examining the impact of government fragmentation on their
measure of sprawl which uses aerial photography to measure increases in density from 1976
to 1992. While their count of local governments shows little relationship with sprawl, they
do point to intergovernmental transfers that finance infrastructure to outlying development as
being positively related to sprawl. This type of transfer, usually coming from county or state
governments, is regional in nature, but it is presumably not what most regionalists concerned
with sprawl have in mind when they argue for greater regional coordination of development.
As was the case with urban growth, the lack of a strong relationship between broad measures
of government fractionalization and the growth in sprawl does not mean that a well-tailored
regional policy might not have a large impact. It suggests, however, that regional governance or
a lack thereof, does not inherently lead to more compact urban areas.
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3.5 Conclusion
The number of municipal and town governments in urban areas has barely budged over the last
50 years, leaving large differences across areas in the rate of fractionalization of local government
largely unchanged. Should we worry that places with more or less fragmented government
might be falling behind? The experience of the last 40 years suggests this is not likely to be
the case. On core metrics of urban performance such as population and income growth neither
governance structure shows much advantage compared to the other once a modest set of controls
is introduced. Fractionalized areas seem to be slightly more attractive to college educated workers,
but have seen segregation fall somewhat less rapidly. On issues of sprawl and land use policy,
often focuses of discussions of regional policy, little difference is observed between places with
differing concentrations of local governments.
This is not to say that regionalism has no role to play in urban policy. Certainly the results
on racial segregation bear watching, and further research on the role of government fragmentation
in the recent growth of economic segregation documented by Bischoff and Reardon (2011) is
warranted. Understanding more about what is driving the correlation between growth in the
share of bachelor’s degree holders and fractionalization takes on increasing importance in a world
in which city size and city skill level seem increasingly complementary (Abel et al., 2012).
Furthermore, as cities face differing challenges, different tools are often necessary. In the
early twentieth century, when rapidly expanding access to secondary education was the primary
local responsibility, the flexibility of small fractionalized school districts throughout much of the
country allowed America to pull ahead of more centralized approach pursued in Europe. On the
other hand, in the late 19th century, when a lack of access to clean drinking water plagued many
of the nation’s urban areas, a regionally coordinated approach was more effective at providing
the most urgently needed local public good (Cutler and Miller, 2005).
In both these cases, local government took the form not only of municipal and local govern-
ments, but also of school districts and special districts that did not fit tightly within already
established borders. Perhaps one explanation for the limited impact of town and municipal
government density over the last half century is that these more flexible forms of governance arise
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when needed to tackle challenges that extant local governments are unable to handle. Of course
regional water authorities do not arise out of thin air - they require the types of coalition building
and coordination that is the focus of much work on regionalism. The broad picture painted here
may obscure these more complicated underlying dynamics. Nonetheless, by disentangling the
impact of regionalism from other broad economic forces playing out across US metro areas, the
results presented here caution against interpreting the strong growth of some highly regionalized
urban areas as evidence for the overall dominance of regional governance over recent decades.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Defining Sub-Regions of Greater Boston
In defining four regions to analyze heterogeneity in the treatment effect across different types
of jurisdictions, I aimed to create four regions that were relatively internally consistent in their
composition but that provided contrasts with each other. While I largely followed pre-defined
county and New England City and Town Area (NECTA) division lines, I exerted some judgment
given knowledge of the area to come up with the specific lists of cities.
1) The Urban Core - I define the urban core as the city of Boston and any city that falls
within 5 miles of the city’s political and economic center in Northeast Boston. In practice nearly
all of these cities fall to the north, and are generally a set of racially integrated suburbs. This set
of 10 municipalities includes Brookline, Boston, Cambridge, Chelsea, Everett, Malden, Medford,
Somerville, Winthrop, and Revere.
2) The Route 128 Corridor - Route 128, which runs concurrently with Interstate 95 in
the Boston metro area, is the inner of the 2 circumferential highways, circling the city center
at a distance between 10 and 15 miles. It runs through or near many of Boston’s wealthiest
suburbs and is a hub of high tech employment. I use suburbs that fall just inside or outside
the road from its origin just south of the city to the edge of Essex County. This set of 27
towns includes Arlington, Bedford, Belmont, Burlington, Concord, Lexington, Lincoln, Melrose,
Natick, Newton, North Reading, Reading, Sudbury, Stoneham, Waltham, Wakefield, Watertown,
122
Wayland, Weston, Wilmington, Woburn and Winchester in Middlesex County and Dedham,
Dover, Needham, Wellesley, and Westwood in Norfolk County.
3) I define the Northern Suburbs as encompassing all of Essex County with the exception of the
far northern coastal communities that have little in common demographically and economically
with their neighbors. The 22 towns in this group are Andover, Beverly, Boxford, Danvers,
Georgetown, Groveland, Hamilton, Haverhill, Lawrence, Lynn, Lynnfield, Marblehead, Methuen,
Middleton, Nahant, North Andover, Peabody, Salem, Saugus, Swampscott, Topsfield, and
Wenham.
4) The Southern Suburbs extend south from the city limits to Brockton, Massachusetts.
The 18 towns included are Abington, Avon, Braintree, Bridgewater, Brockton, Canton, East
Bridgewater, Easton, Holbrook, Milton, Norwood, Quincy, Randolph, Sharon, Stoughton, West
Bridgewater, Weymouth, and Whitman.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data Appendix for Chapter 2
For Figures 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4, and Equations 2.1 and 2.2, productivity (or output per worker) is
calculated by dividing the Gross Metropolitan Product for 2001 (from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmetro/) by the total labor force for 2000 (from
published 2000 Census figures). Population and share with BAs also comes from the published
2000 Census figures, and this population and BA data are also used in Figure 2.2. For Figure
2.3, Less Skilled Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) refer to those MSAs that have the share
of the population with BAs in 2000 less than 17.64 percent. For Figure 2.3, More Skilled MSAs
refer to those MSAs that have the share of the population with BAs in 2000 more than 25.025
percent. For Equation 2.3, population and share with BAs in 1940 comes from published 1940
Census figures. For Equation 2.7, population in 1900 comes from published 1900 Census figures.
For Equation 2.4, real family income is calculated using family median income from the published
2000 Census figures, divided by the cost-of-living index for each MSA published by the American
Chamber of Commerce Research Association at http://www.coli.org/. Data for Figure 2.5 are
calculated using the 2006 Annual Survey of Manufactures, with details described in the paragraph
about Table 2.2 below.
The individual-level data used in Tables 2.1 and 2.3 come from the Integrated Public
UseMicrodata Series (IPUMS) 2000, five percent Census sample. Where aggregate metro-area
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numbers such as population and the percentage of workers over 25 with a college degree are used
in conjunction with individual-level data, these are merged on from published Census figures,
since the IPUMS does not fully identify all metro areas. All individual-level regressions are run
for male workers aged 25 to 65. Hourly earnings are calculated by dividing yearly earned income
by number of weeks worked and usual weekly hours. Experience is calculated as age minus years
of schooling minus six, where years of schooling is approximated as precisely as possible using
the categorical schooling variable provided in the 2000 Census. All calculations are weighted by
person weight unless otherwise noted.
In Table 2.2, the state-level log capital per worker, log value added per worker and log hourly
wage were calculated using the total capital expenditures, total value added, number of employees,
total production workers wages, and total production workers hours data from the 2006 Annual
Survey of Manufactures at factfinder.census.gov. The state-level density and years of schooling
variables come directly from Table 2 of Productivity and the Density of Economic Activity by
Antonio Ciccone and Robert E. Hall, American Economic Review, March 1996.
Data for Table 2.4 come from the General Social Survey. In 1994, eight reasoning questions
were asked that required the respondent to assess the similarities between various objects and
ideas. Their responses were coded as correct, partly correct, or incorrect by the GSS, and
information on this coding is available in Appendix D of the GSS cumulative codebook. Our
dependent variable is the number of fully correct responses out of the eight questions. The
vocabulary test, given in 17 waves of the survey spaced between 1974 and 2006, asks the
respondent 10 vocabulary questions and records the number of correct responses. We pool
across the waves, weighting using the WTSSALL variable which, which adjusts for the ways that
the counting of households in the survey has changed over time. For the residence variables,
categories of xnorcsize (current residence) are combined so as to mirror the categories of the
res16 (residence at age 16) variable as closely as possible.
125
